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•	 Official	customs	data	from	South	Korea,	Japan,	
China	and	the	United	States	indicate	that	in	2013,	
these	four	countries	(which	account	for	nearly	all	of	
Russia’s	official	crab	exports)	imported	1.69	times	
as	much	live	and	frozen	crab	from	Russia	as	official	
Russian	harvest	levels.	Over	the	past	decade,	the	
level	of	overharvest	due	to	illegal	crab	harvesting	
was	two	to	four	times	the	legal	limit,	causing	grave	
concern	about	the	sustainability	of	several	Russian	
Far	East	crab	species.	
•	 Foreign-flagged	vessels	harvest	crab	illegally	in	
Russian	waters,	and	some	Russian-flagged	ves-
sels	either	overharvest	or	harvest	crab	illegally.	
Misdeclaring	product	quantities,	off-loading	unde-
clared	product	onto	a	transport	vessel	at	sea,	or	
delivering	undeclared	crab	(or	declared	using	fake	
documentation)	directly	to	a	foreign	port	are	known	
techniques	to	launder	crab.	Foreign	ports	receiving	
Russian	crab	are	typically	in	Japan	and	South	Korea	
and	are	also	likely	to	be	intermediary	stop-offs	or	
final	destinations	for	illegal	Russian	crab.	
•	 WWF	examined	the	Automatic	Identification	
System	(AIS)	signals	for	32	vessels	believed	to	
have	delivered	crab	to	Hokkaido,	Japan	in	early	
2012.	Two	foreign-flagged	vessels	showed	a	pat-
tern	that	indicated	harvesting	in	Russian	waters	
and	three	foreign-flagged	vessels	approached	the	
Russia-Japan	maritime	border,	which	could	indi-
cate	transshipment.	Five	Russian-flagged	vessels	
showed	a	pattern	of	possible	harvesting	in	Russian	
waters	and	motoring	directly	to	ports	in	Japan	
without	stopping	in	a	Russian	port	first	to	register	
the	catch,	therefore	potentially	violating	Russian	
law	(if	crab	or	other	seafood	from	Russian	waters	
was	off-loaded	in	Japan).	
•	 Several	species	of	crab	are	commercially	import-
ant	to	both	Alaska	and	Russian	crab	fisheries,	
but	the	highest	value	is	garnered	by	red	king	crab	
(Paralithodes	camtschaticus).	King	crab	is	con-
sumed	in	large	quantities	in	the	United	States	
with	the	source	of	this	crab	generally	split	between	
domestic	harvests	from	Alaska	and	imports	
from	Russia.	On	average	over	the	last	ten	years,	
three-quarters	of	the	king	crab	consumed	in	the	
U.S.	market	is	from	Russia.	With	21%	of	total	U.S.	
crab	imports	coming	from	Russia	in	2012,	the	
United	States	is	likely	importing	crab	that	was	har-
vested	illegally.	
•	 The	current	U.S.	system	for	seafood	imports	is	not	
able	to	detect	or	block	every	shipment	of	illegally	
harvested	crab.	Currently,	seafood-tracking	systems	
that	verify	legality	are	not	in	common	practice.		
•	 In	recent	years,	Russia	has	worked	to	shrink	the	ille-
gal	crab	problem	by	developing	bilateral	agreements	
with	Japan	and	South	Korea,	developing	a	national	
plan	of	action	to	address	illegal	fisheries,	and	
continued	enforcement	at-sea.	Yet	the	problem	is	
multilateral	and	it	demands	a	multilateral	solution.	
Executive Summary
World	Wildlife	Fund	investigated	the	trade	flow	of	illegal	and	legal	crab	harvested	from	Russian	waters	
throughout	the	Pacific	Rim	to	better	understand	the	likelihood	of	U.S.	importation	of	illegally	harvested	
Russian	crab,	as	well	as	conservation	concerns	associated	with	overharvest	of	crab	from	Russian	waters.		 
This	report	found	the	following:	
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Encompassing	over	a	million	square	miles,	the	Bering	Sea	is	one	
of	the	world’s	most	productive	marine	ecoregions,	sustaining	more	
than	500	species	of	fish,	birds	and	mammals,	hundreds	of	human	
communities.	The	Bering	Sea	supplies	half	the	annual	seafood	
catch	for	the	U.S.,	and	the	Bering	Sea	and	Sea	of	Okhotsk	supply	
more	than	half	of	Russia’s	annual	seafood	catch.	World	Wildlife	
Fund	(WWF)	identified	the	Bering	Sea,	in	a	Global	200	conserva-
tion	assessment,	as	“one	of	the	most	outstanding	yet	endangered	
marine	environments,	whose	protection	is	essential	for	the	
preservation	of	the	world’s	biodiversity”	(Olson	and	Dinerstein	
2002).	Similarly,	the	Sea	of	Okhotsk	is	a	highly	productive	marine	
ecosystem	supporting	an	array	of	marine	species,	human	uses	and	
large-scale	fisheries	removals.	The	cold,	upwelled	waters	in	the	Sea	
of	Okhotsk	support	massive	pollock,	salmon	and	crab	fisheries,	
which	serve	as	an	economic	engine	in	the	Russian	Far	East.		
This	high	productivity,	combined	with	the	shear	remoteness	
and	vastness	of	the	western	Bering	Sea	and	Sea	of	Okhotsk,	has	
exposed	this	area	to	illegal	harvesting	activities	that	are	both	
lucrative	and	difficult	to	prevent.	In	response	to	increasing	
concern	about	the	impact	of	illegal	fisheries	in	these	globally	
significant	marine	areas,	in	2014	WWF	experts	investigated	the	
trade	flow	of	legal	and	illegal	crab	harvested	in	Russian	waters	
using	primary	sources	such	as	Russian	crab	stock	assessments,	
publically	accessible	trade	and	customs	data,	interviews	with	
experts	and	media	sources	to	obtain	a	unique	picture	of	the	
flows	of	legal	and	illegal	crab	products.	Among	other	discov-
eries,	WWF	found	that	most	Russian	crab	goes	to	Japan	for	
consumption.	Russian	crab	headed	to	the	U.S.	stops	first	in	an	
Asian	port,	and	China	does	not	appear	to	play	a	major	role	in	
crab	trade	flows.
Based	on	extensive	analyses	of	these	data,	WWF	concludes	
that	illegal	crab	harvest	in	Russia	exceeded	the	legal	limit	
between	1.7	and	4	times	over	the	past	decade.	Official	customs	
data	indicate	that	both	legal	and	illegal	Russian	crab	is	likely	
imported	by	South	Korea,	Japan	and	the	United	States.	Foreign	
vessels	and	some	Russian	vessels	illegally	harvest	crab,	and	this	
extreme	overexploitation	of	crab	causes	grave	concern	about	
the	sustainability	of	several	Russian	Far	East	crab	species.	
This	report	provides	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	drivers	
of	Russian	crab	trade	and	existing	loopholes	that	allow	for	the	
overharvest	and	illicit	trade	of	Russian	crab	to	continue.	In	
particular,	this	report	includes:
•	 an	explanation	of	the	method	used	to	estimate	illegal	crab	
harvest	volumes	and	analysis	of	crab	trade	data	
•	 a	description	of	known	schemes	for	illegal	crab	harvest	
and	trade	and	bilateral	assessment/discussion	of	bilateral	
agreements	between	Russia	and	its	main	trade	partners:	
South	Korea,	Japan,	China	and	the	United	States
•	 a	compilation	of	recently	published	Russian	and	inter-
national	news	reports	that	shows	the	complexity	and	
pervasiveness	of	illegal	crab	harvesting	from	Russian	
waters	and	the	depth	of	involvement	by	foreigners	and	
Russians	alike
•	 a	description	of	conservation	impacts	of	overexploitation	of	
Russian	crab
•	 recommendations	for	key	stakeholders,	including	U.S.	and	
Japanese	governments	and	buyers
Overview
© Hartmut Jungius / WWF-Canon
Frozen, whole  
red king crab.
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Introduction 
From	the	fridgid	marine	waters	of	the	Bering	Sea	
and	the	Sea	of	Okhotsk,	Russia	and	the	United	
States	(Alaska),	produce	almost	91,000	metric	
tons	(200	million	pounds)	of	legally	caught	crab	
each	year.	Besides	the	legal	harvests	illegal	crab	
floods	global	markets,	which	causes	artificially	
low	prices	for	legal	harvesters	and	overexploita-
tion	of	Russian	Far	East	(RFE)	crab	stocks	that	
could	otherwise	be	sustainably	managed.	
Media	reports	in	Russian	and	international	
press	frequently	cover	specific	instances	of	ille-
gal,	unreported	and	unregulated	fishing	(IUU1)	
of	crab	confiscated	by	Russian	authorities	or	
imported	by	Russia’s	main	trade	partners.	
Nikolai	Fyodorov,	head	of	the	Russian	Ministry	
of	Agriculture,	the	body	overseeing	Russia’s	
Federal	Fishery	Agency	(Rosrybolovstvo),	
noted	that	Russia	loses	up	to	$1	billion	per	
year	from	illegal	fishing	of	all	seafood	species,	including	crab	
(Primamedia	2014b).	This	estimated	loss	was	corroborated	by	
Russia’s	Government	Accountability	Office,	according	to	a	report	
given	at	the	September	2014	International	Fishery	Congress	in	
Vladivostok.	That	report	also	noted	that	that	this	figure	exceeds	
the	net	income	of	all	Russian	fisheries	businesses	in	2011	(14.4	
billion	rubles	or	$470	million)	and	is	more	than	15%	the	annual	
turnover	of	all	of	Russia’s	fishery	enterprises	(127.8	billion	rubles	
or	$4.2	billion)	(Sukharenko	et	al.	2014).
This	lost	tax	revenue,	at	least	partially,	flows	to	the	foreign- 
flagged	vessels	that	harvest	crab	illegally	in	Russian	waters,	and	
also	to	some	Russian-flagged	vessels	that	either	overharvest	or	
harvest	crab	illegally.	Known	techniques	to	launder	and	move	
illegal	crab	include	transshipping,	misdeclaring,	falsifying	doc-
umentation,	and	mislabeling.	Foreign	ports	receiving	Russian	
crab	are	typically	in	Japan	and	South	Korea.	These	may	serve	as	
an	intermediate	stop-off	or	a	final	destination	for	illegal	Russian	
crab	that	typically	end	up	in	Japan	and	the	United	States.
When	illegal	crab	is	internationally	traded,	it	increases	the	world	
supply,	depresses	prices,	and	hence	diminishes	the	competitive-
ness	and	viability	of	the	legal	crab	industry.	Illegal	Russian	crab	is	
an	important	issue	for	Alaska’s	crab	fishery,	a	$910	million	dollar	
industry,	which	competes	directly	with	Russian	crab,	particu-
larly	king	crab,	in	the	United	States	and	on	the	global	market	
(McDowell	Group	2013;	Hermann	and	Greenberg	2006). 2 
Several	species	of	crab	are	commercially	important	to	both	the	
Alaskan	and	Russian	crab	fisheries	(Box	1).	
1 This	WWF	report	on	crab	uses	the	singular	term	‘illegal’	interchangeably	with	
the	term	IUU,	which	is	to	say	the	word	‘illegal’	used	here	is	inclusive	of	unreported	
(i.e.	overharvested),	and	unregulated	fishing.
2	Crab	harvest	from	the	state	of	Alaska	is	the	United	States’	only	domestic	source	
of	king	and	snow	crab.	As	early	as	1992,	Russia	overtook	Alaska	as	the	leading	
supplier	of	king	crab	to	Japanese	and	U.S.	markets.	Meanwhile,	in	1995	Russia	
overtook	Alaska	as	the	top	snow	crab	exporter	to	Japan	and	in	2000	Russia	
overtook	Alaska	as	the	top	snow	crab	supplier	to	the	U.S.	See	Hermann	and	
Greenberg	(2006).
BOX 1  
CRAB SPECIES OF RUSSIA & COMMON NAMES 
King crab
Paralithodes camtschaticus (red king / Kamchatka / краб камчатский) 
Paralithodes platypus (blue king / краб синий)
Paralithodes brevipes (spiny brown king / краб колючий)
Lithodes aequispinus (golden king / brown king  / краб равношипый)
Snow crab
Chionoecetes opilio (opilio /queen /snow / краб-стригун опилио)
Chionoecetes bairdi (tanner / snow / bairdi / краб-стригун берди/бэрда)
Chionoecetes angulatus  (triangle tanner / краб-стригун ангулятус)
Chionoecetes japonicus (red snow / краб-стригун красный)
Other crab
Eriocheir sinensis (hairy mitten / Японский мохнаторукий краб)
Erimacrus isenbeckii (Japanese horsehair / краб волосатый четырехугольный)
Year Percent from U.S. (Alaska)
Percent from 
Russia
2003 19.0% 79.5%
2004 21.1% 72.3%
2005 12.7% 82.3%
2006 5.6% 89.7%
2007 11.3% 83.6%
2008 16.9% 77.4%
2009 15.3% 80.8%
2010 23.5% 73.6%
2011 19.7% 78.0%
2012 21.4% 69.5%
2013* 19.8% 65.8%
11-yr avg. 16.9% 77.5%
*For 2013, Alaskan king crab TAC level used as a proxy for U.S. commercial landings due to 
lack of 2013 official catch data.
Data sources: NOAA (2014a, 2014b), Global Trade Atlas (2014)
TABLE 1  
PERCENT OF U.S. DOMESTIC MARKET SUPPLY 
OF FROZEN KING CRAB FROM U.S. (ALASKA) 
AND RUSSIA
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The	highest	value	of	these	species	is	garnered	by	red	king	crab	
(Paralithodes camtschaticus,	known	as	Kamchatka	crab	in	
Russia).	Three	species	of	king	crab	(red,	blue	and	golden)	are	
consumed	in	large	quantities	in	the	United	States.3	U.S.	market	
sources	of	these	three	species	of	king	crab	historically	have	
been	split	primarily	between	Alaska	and	Russia	(Monterey	
Bay	Aquarium	2010).	WWF	calculated	that	Alaska	crab	has	
supplied,	on	average	for	the	past	11	years,	only	16.9%	of	the	
U.S.	domestic	consumer	market	for	king	crab	while	Russia	has	
supplied	77.5%,	on	average	(see	Table	1)	(SeafoodNews	2014).		
3	Common	names	are	not	universally	used	for	many	species	and	often	are	not	
the	same	names	used	within	the	industry	from	one	country	to	another.	Common	
names	used	by	the	U.S.	seafood	industry,	for	instance,	would	label	three	of	
these	species	as	‘king’	crab	and	only	two	as	‘snow’	crab.		In	the	U.S.,	‘king’	crab	
specifically	refers	to	three	species:		red	king	crab	(Paralithodes camtschaticus),	
blue	king	crab	(Paralithodes platypus),	and	golden	(or	brown)	king	crab	(Lithodes 
aequispinus).		In	Russia,	however,	the	aggregate	category	‘king’	crab	is	not	used,	
with	Russia	instead	using	specific	common	names	for	each	of	the	species	that	
make	up	the	U.S.’s	‘king	crab’	grouping.	Some	foreign	countries	periodically	use	
the	term	‘king’	crab	as	it	is	a	heavily	used	term	in	the	U.S.,	where	there	is	a	large	
consumer	market	for	crab.	However,	it	appears	that	international	usage	is	applied	
sometimes	to	the	Paralithodes	genus,	thus	leading	to	an	asymmetric	usage.		
Because	the	common	term	‘king’	crab’	(used	in	the	U.S.)	is	not	synonymous	with	
Paralithodes,	it	can	be	unclear	internationally	which	specific	species	of	crab	
are	being	referenced.	Meanwhile,	with	respect	to	‘snow’	crab,	Russian	common	
names	indicate	that	all	four	Chionoecetes	species	are	commercially	harvested	
under	the	term	‘streegune’	instead	of	‘snow.’	Whereas,	in	the	U.S.,	the	common	
name	‘snow’	crab,	often	only	refers	to	Chionoecetes opilio,	but	sometimes	includes	
Chionoecetes bairdi	with	‘Tanner’	crab	an	alternate	or	second	name	for	C. bairdi.	
The	other	two	species	of	‘snow’	crab	that	Russia	considers	part	of	its	aggregate	
‘streegune’	category	(Triangle	tanner	crab	and	red	snow	crab)	are	not	harvested	
in	U.S.	waters	and	thus	are	not	normally	considered	as	‘snow’	crab.	Therefore,	
‘snow’	crab	is	an	unclear	common	term	for	multiple	species	of	the	Chionoecetes 
genus.	Importantly,	this	level	of	confusion	with	crab	species	naming		goes	beyond	
each	country’s	crab	industry	norms,	and	also	is	present	in	each	country’s	Customs	
classifications	and	trade	data.	When	common	names	are	used	in	trade	data	
reporting	or	when	groupings	of	species	are	not	consistent	among	countries,	it	
prevents	a	direct	comparison	of	harvest,	import	and	export	data	and	complicates	
trade	data	analysis	(see	pages	22	and	23	for	a	more	thorough	discussion	of	
the	problems	associated	with	current	crab	classification	categories	in	Customs	
and	trade	data).	Throughout	this	report,	the	terms	‘king’	and	‘snow’	are	used	
only	when	they	are	accompanied	by	a	clarification	of	which	species	each	term	
encapsulates.
Because	of	the	high	rate	of	crab	imports	from	Russia,	
Americans	dining	on	king	or	snow	crab	may	be	consuming	
Russian	crab,	and	if	so,	should	be	aware	that	a	significant	
portion	of	crab	from	Russian	waters	could	be	illegal.	Currently,	
government	or	private	entities	do	not	commonly	use	sea-
food-tracking	systems	that	verify	legality.	
U.S.	companies	that	import	illegal	crab	from	Russia,	even	if	
they	do	so	unknowingly,	may	be	held	legally	responsible	with	
penalties	ranging	from	product	forfeiture	to	criminal	pros-
ecution.	The	U.S.	Lacey	Act	prohibits	trade	in	wildlife,	fish	
(including	seafood)	and	plants	(including	wood)	that	have	been	
illegally	taken,	possessed,	transported	or	sold.	The	most	recent	
Lacey	Act	case	involving	illegal	crab	occurred	in	2011.	The	U.S.	
company	Harbor	Seafood,	Inc.	forfeited	$2.75	million	worth	of	
king	crab	(see	Box	2).	The	value	of	Harbor	Seafood’s	forfeited	
imports	represented	1.3%	of	the	total	value	of	United	States’	
imports	of	Russian	crab	during	that	year.4 
Importantly,	Russia’s	domestic	data,	(such	as	official	total	
allowable	catch	[TAC],	catch	and	export	volumes),	portray	
a	normal,	regulated	fishery	that	does	not	catch	more	than	
is	allocated	and	does	not	export	more	than	is	caught	(see	
Figure	1).	However,	illegal	crab	is	not	reflected	in	these	
domestic	catch	data	or	Russian	export	volumes.		It	was	not	
until	WWF	looked	at	Japanese,	South	Korean,	U.S.	and	other	
import	data	that	major	trade	discrepancies	became	apparent	
in	Russian	crab	trade	quantities,	with	volumes	far	exceeding	
annual	catch	limits.	
4	The	United	States	imported	$	218	million	of	Russian	crab	in	2010	and	$	208	
million	in	2011.
© WWF-US / Heather Brandon
King crab legs and meat 
for sale in a Russian 
seafood market.
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USA Import from Russia
China Import from Russia
Japan Import from Russia
South Korea Import from Russia
Total Aggregate Russian Crab
Imports by USA, China, Japan &
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FIGURE 1
RUSSIAN CRAB TAC, CATCH, AND EXPORT DATA (IN COLOR) WITH OFFICIAL IMPORT DATA (IN 
GRAYSCALE), 2000-20135 
5	The	live	weight	equivalent	(LWE)	unit	allows	comparison	between	metric	tons	of	live	and	frozen	crab	by	converting	the	weight	of	frozen	crab	to	its	‘live	weight	
equivalent’.	Conversion	of	frozen	weight	to	its	live	weight	equivalent	is	consistent	with	Russian	and	U.S.	literature	on	the	subject	and	assumes,	on	average,	frozen	crab	
weighs	60%	of	its	live	weight	(TINRO	2014).	This	conversion	is	used	throughout	this	paper	to	aggregate	the	frozen	and	live	crab	categories	in	trade	data.
Data Sources: Russian Federal Fishery Agency–TAC (2014), Russian Federal Fishery Agency–Harvest Data (2014), Global Trade Atlas (2014)
BOX 2
THE U.S. LACEY ACT, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA) REGULATIONS AND 
ILLEGAL CRAB
American companies and individuals that import illegally harvested seafood—knowingly or not—put themselves at risk of violating the 
United States Lacey Act (16  U.S.C. § 3371-3378). The Lacey Act also prohibits false labelling, such as improperly labelled packaging. The 
Act provides for criminal and civil penalties, which range from jail time to fines and forfeiture of seafood and vessels. In addition, products 
covered by the Lacey Act, including crab, that are taken in violation of a foreign government’s regulations are subject to forfeiture under 
the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3374(a), on a strict liability basis. In a recent case, (United States v. 144,774 Pounds of Blue King Crab, 410 
F.3d 1131 [9th Cir. 2005]) an innocent owner defense was raised in the forfeiture proceedings. The court held that under the Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 983, the innocent owner defense cannot be asserted when the property to be forfeited is “contraband or 
other property that it is illegal to possess.”
U.S. FDA regulations require food products entering the U.S. to be accompanied by information on its last processing facility, which must also 
be registered in advance with the FDA. Failure to comply with each FDA requirement is grounds for forfeiture. Forfeiture is a clear risk to U.S. 
seafood companies and individual employees which “fail to exercise reasonable care” in complying with importation regulations, including 
product origin, product labelling, packing lists, accurate invoices and facility registration. These obligations firmly rest with the U.S. importer. 
A 2011 Lacey Act case involved Russian crab (United States v. 112 Metric Tons of Frozen King Crab, No. 11-334 [W.D. Wa.)] [filed Feb. 
24, 2011]) imported by a U.S. company, Harbor Seafood, Inc. The company attempted to import Russian blue king crab that had been 
harvested by vessels that did not possess enough crab quotas or were not permitted to harvest crab in Russia. The Russian crab was 
believed to be transshipped through South Korea before being imported into the United States.  As a result of violations of the Lacey Act 
and FDA regulatory requirements, Harbor Seafood, Inc. forfeited $2.75 million worth of crab in 2011, which it later bought back from the 
U.S. government at auction, essentially paying twice for the same crab. The case was settled in 2012. 
Assistant U.S. Attorney Francis Franze-Nakamura notes (2014), “This case sends a message to importers who are not exercising reasonable 
care that what happened to Harbor Seafood, Inc. could happen to you. You could be looking at the complete loss of your shipment.”
Sources: NOAA (2012), Seattle Times (2011b), Alexander (2014), U.S. Department of Justice (2005)
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In	recent	years,	Russia	has	worked	to	combat	illegal	fishing	in	
its	waters	by	developing	bilateral	agreements	with	Japan,	South	
Korea	and	China,	developing	a	National	Action	Plan	to	address	
illegal	fisheries,	including	crab,	and	continuing	enforcement	
at	sea.	Russia	and	the	United	States	are	working	to	develop	
a	bilateral	agreement	regarding	the	mutual	cooperation	of	
the	two	nations	to	address	IUU.	Indeed,	levels	of	illegal	crab	
harvest	have	fallen	from	egregiously	high	amounts	that	were	
four	times	the	legal	limit	in	2006	and	2007	to	less	than	two	
times	the	legal	limit	in	2013.	Despite	these	efforts,	illegal	crab	
continues	to	be	harvested	in	Russian	waters,	with	imports	of	
Russian	crab	exceeding	the	official	harvest	volume	by	1.7	times	
in	2013.	As	this	report	shows,	the	problem	is	multilateral	and	
thus	demands	multilateral	solutions.	
General Russian Crab Harvest 
& Total Allowable Catch 
Information
In	Russia’s	waters,	ten	species	of	crab	are	commercially	har-
vested	(see	Box	1).	The	Russian	Federation	maintains	fishing	
zone	jurisdictions	and	publishes	yearly	total	allowable	catch	
(TAC)	levels	for	each	of	the	ten	species.	Table	2	indicates	
Russia’s	overall	TAC	for	crab	as	well	as	red	king	crab	TAC	as	
split	between	Russia’s	western	Barents	Sea	(bordering	Norway),	
and	Russia’s	Pacific	waters	(Bering	Sea	and	Sea	of	Okhotsk)	in	
the	Russian	Far	East	(RFE).	Red	king	crab	and	snow	crab	in	the	
Barents	Sea	are	non-native	(see	Box	3	on	the	history	of	Russia’s	
commercial	crab	fishery	in	the	Barents	Sea),	and	therefore	over-
exploitation	is	not	a	conservation	concern.	
TABLE 2 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH (TAC) FOR CRAB, 2010-2014
All values in metric tons 2010 TAC 2011 TAC 2012 TAC 2013 TAC 2014 TAC
Total  
Crab
Red King 
Crab
Total  
Crab
Red King 
Crab
Total  
Crab
Red King 
Crab
Total  
Crab
Red King 
Crab
Total  
Crab
Red King 
Crab
TOTAL 49,831 5,828 49,075 5,460 49,097 7,371 61,396 14,241 62,748 13,722
Total in Far East Basin 45,830 1,828 45,074 1,460 43,596 1,871 55,395 8,241 55,148 7,222
Total in Barents Sea 4,000 4,000 4,001 4,000 5,501 5,500 6,001 6,000 6,000 6,500
Percent of TAC 
that is in the Barents Sea 8.0% 68.6% 8.2% 73.3% 11.2% 74.6% 9.8% 42.1% 12.1% 47.4%
Data Source: Russian Federal Fishery Agency – TAC (2014)
FIGURE 2
MAP OF RUSSIAN FAR EAST FISHING SUB-ZONES
Map Source: http://www.dalryba.ru/ssd/map1.gif, amended and updated by WWF
Basin Codes:
273 -North Sea of Okhotsk
277 Ю/С -South / North Primorye
274 -West Kamchatka
398 -West Bering Sea
278 -East Sakhalinsk (Okhotsk)
275 -East Sakhalinsk (Sea of Japan)
272 -Kamchatka-Kurilsk
267 & 268 -North Kurilsk
270 & 271 -South Kurilsk
264 -Karagansk
265 -Petropavlovsk-Komandorovsk
298- Central Sea of Okhotsk 
 (officially part of Russia’s 
continental shelf as of March 2014
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WWF	focused	primarily	on	legal	and	illegal	commercial	crab	
fisheries	in	the	RFE,	rather	than	in	the	Barents,	because	all	crab	
species	in	the	RFE	are	native	and	subject	to	potential	overex-
ploitation.	Figure	2	depicts	a	map	of	the	RFE	fishing	sub-zone	
basins	in	the	North	Pacific,	and	these	sub-zones	are	referenced	
throughout	this	paper.
King Crab 
Historically,	red	king	crab	was	Russia’s	most	commercially	
valuable	species	of	crab	and	comprised	about	half	of	Russia’s	
total	crab	harvest	(Ivanov	2002).	However	this	percent	started	
to	decline	in	the	1990s,	and	between	2001	and	2005	red	king	
crab	fell	from	31.1%	to	4.2%	of	the	total	TAC	for	all	crab	species	
(TINRO	2014).6	By	the	mid-2000s,	it	was	clear	that	red	king	
crab	stocks	in	the	Russian	Far	East	had	been	heavily	overex-
ploited	and	were	suffering	from	catastrophic	decline.7
There	are	three	main	populations	of	red	king	crab	in	the	Russian	
Far	East:		(1)	Western	Kamchatka	and	Kamchatka-Kuril	Islands	
(Western	Kamchatka	population),	(2)	North-Okhotsk	Sea,	and	
(3)	Primorye	and	Western	Sakhalin		(Dvoretsky	and	Dvoretsky	
2014). 8			In	2005-2006,	due	to	the	consistent	overharvest	of	
red	king	crab	in	the	Far	East,	the	historically	abundant	West	
Kamchatka	and	Kamchatka-Kurilsk	harvest	sub-zones	(sub-zones	
6	Between	1999	and	2006,	the	official	harvest	of	red	king	crab	fell	by	17	times,	
from	33,000	to	under	2,000	mt	(from	73	million	lbs.	to	under	4	million	lbs.).
7	Also	in	the	mid-2000s,	the	Barents	Sea	invasive	red	king	crab	population	
dramatically	increased	and	a	commercial	red	king	crab	fishery	began	there.		
8	There	are	other	smaller	populations	of	red	king	crab	in	the	Russian	Far	East;	
however,	they	represent	a	much	smaller	proportion	of	the	total	stock.
274	and	272	in	Figure	2),	home	to	the	
largest	of	these	three	populations	and	
surveyed	annually	for	over	30	years,	
were	closed	to	commercial	crab	fishing.	
Although	the	fishery	was	re-opened	
briefly	in	2007,	the	stock	of	red	king	crab	
continued	to	decline	drastically.		
In	2008,	West	Kamchatka	and	
Kamchatka-Kurilsk	sub-zones	were	
closed	to	king	crab	harvesting	indef-
initely.		In	2013,	the	Russian	Federal	
Fishery	Agency	determined	that	red	
king	crab	stocks	in	the	West	Kamchatka	
and	the	Kamchatka-Kurilsk	sub-
zones	had	sufficiently	recovered	and	
re-opened	these	areas	to	commercial	
crabbing,	thus	causing	Russia’s	overall	
red	king	crab	TAC	to	double	from	2012	
to	2013	(see	Table	2).	Additionally,	
with	the	re-opening	of	these	sub-zones	
in	2013,	the	red	king	crab	TAC	in	the	
RFE	became	higher	than	the	TAC	in	
the	Barents	Sea	(National	Fishery	
Resources	2014).	Figure	3	indicates	
that	the	most	productive	harvest	areas	for	the	three	king	crab	
species	(red,	blue	and	golden)	is	the	West	Kamchatka	(sub-zone	
No.	274)	with	32%	of	the	total	aggregate	TAC	for	these	species.	
During	the	summer	of	2014,	Russia’s	Pacific	Scientific	Research	
Center	for	Fisheries	and	Oceanography	(TINRO)	officially	peti-
tioned	the	All-Russian	Scientific	Research	Center	for	Fisheries	
and	Oceanography	(VNIRO)	to	substantially	increase	the	red	
king	crab	TAC	in	the	West	Kamchatka	and	Kamchatka-Kurilsk	
sub-zones.	The	proposal	to	increase	the	previously	set	TAC	from	
3.3-	to	6.1-thousand	metric	tons	(mt)	in	the	West	Kamchatka	
sub-zone	(7.2-	to	13.4-million	lbs.),	and	from	1.79-	to	3.78-thou-
sand	mt	(3.9-	to	8.3-	million	lbs.)	in	the	Kamchatka-Kurilsk	
sub-zone,	was	based	on	recent	scientific	surveys	done	by	TINRO	
along	with	other	Far	Eastern	fisheries	research	centers	and	was	
presented	to	VNIRO	mid-summer	2014	(TINRO	Center	News	
2014).	At	the	time	of	this	report’s	release	in	autumn	2014,	the	
proposal	had	not	been	accepted	by	VNIRO	and,	hence,	is	not	
currently	in	effect,	even	though	Russia’s	red	king	crab	season	
opened	September	1st	of	2014.		If	accepted,	this	in-season	TAC	
change	would	double	Russia’s	total	TAC	for	red	king	crab	from	
4.9	thousand	mt	to	9.9	thousand	mt	(10.8-	to	21.8-million	
lbs.).	Russia’s	2014	red	king	crab	season	ends	on	December	31,	
2014	and	thus	far	it	is	unclear	whether	Russia’s	red	king	crab	
TAC	will	drastically	increase	partway	through	the	2014	season.		
Additionally,	according	to	TINRO,	blue	king	and	golden	king	
crab	have	had	stable	populations,	with	TAC	levels	for	these	spe-
cies	fluctuating	between	3,000	and	4,000	mt	(6.6	million	and	
8.8	million	lbs.)	through	2012.
32%
26%
16%
7%
7%
4%
4% 3%
1%
274 - West-Kamchatka
Barents Sea (Atlantic)
273 -North Sea of Okhotsk
272 - Kamchatka-Kurilsk
398 - West Bering Sea
277 Ю - South Primorye
277 С - North Primorye 
267 & 268 - North Kurilsk
Other sub-zones
FIGURE 3
2014 KING CRAB TAC
By sub-zone Red, Blue, and Golden (3 spp.)
Total 2014 King Crab TAC = 24,698 mt
Data Source: Russian Federal Fishery Agency – TAC (2014)
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Snow Crab
In	connection	with	the	decline	of	red	
king	crab	in	the	Far	East	basin,	TINRO	
shifted	its	research	in	2009	to	the	more	
productive	snow	crab	species:	opilio,	
red	snow	and	bairdi	(TINRO	2014).	
Opilio	snow	crab	(Chionoecetes opilio)	
became	the	dominant	legal	crab	fishery	
in	Russia’s	Far	East	with	stable	TAC	
levels	hovering	around	20,000	mt	(44	
million	lbs.)	through	2014.	Red	snow	
crab	(Chionoecetes japonicas)	is	found	
in	abundance	in	the	South	Primorye	
sub-zone	(sub-zone	277	Ю	in	Figure	
2)	and	in	2014	has	the	second	highest	
TAC	of	the	snow	crab	species,	ranging	
from	10,500	mt	(44.1	million	lbs.)	in	
2010	to	7,500	mt	(23	million	lbs.)	in	
2014.	Figure	4	indicates	that	the	most	
productive	harvest	area	for	snow	crab,	
according	to	the	2014	TAC	is	the	North	
Sea	of	Okhotsk	(sub-zone	273),	with	
34%	of	the	total	aggregate	TAC	for	four	
snow	crab	species	(opilio,	bairdi,	trian-
gle	Tanner	and	red	snow).
Figure	5	shows	the	distribution	of	the	
2014	TAC	for	king	and	snow	crab	in	
each	harvest	sub-zone.	The	tallest	blue	
bars	indicate	harvest	zones	with	the	
highest	share	of	king	crab	TAC	in	2014.	
For	example,	in	the	West	Kamchatka	
zone	king	crab	is	harvested	almost	
exclusively	(blue	bar	is	99%).		The	dots	
in	the	black	line	mark	the	total	TAC	
amount	for	all	crab	species,	which	for	
West	Kamchatka	sub-zone	is	approx-
imately	8,000	mt	(17.6	million	lbs.).	
Figure	5	depicts	which	sub-zones	
contain	king	crab	(blue	bar),	snow	crab	
(red	bar),	or	both,	and,	separately,	
the	absolute	size	of	the	TAC	in	each	
sub-zone.
FIGURE 4
2014 SNOW CRAB TAC
By Subzone - Opilio, Bairdi, Triangle Tanner & Red Snow (4 spp.)
Total 2014 Snow Crab TAC = 36,619 mt
Data Source: Russian Federal Fishery Agency – TAC (2014)
Photo courtesy of Josh Thomas
Barents Sea (Atlantic)
273 - North Sea of Okhotsk
272 - Kamchatka-Kurilsk
398 - West Bering Sea
277 Ю - South Primorye
277 С - North Primorye 
Other sub-zones
278 - East-Sakhalinsk (Sea of Okhotsk) 
264 - Karagansk
34%
30%
12%
9%
5%
4%
3%
1% 2%
Sorting of snow crab on deck 
a crab harvesting vessel.
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BOX 3
CRAB IN RUSSIA’S BARENTS SEA 
In the 1960s, Russia deliberately introduced red king crab as an alien species into the Barents Sea, bordering Norway in 
northwestern Russia. Red king crab stocks swelled as intended in the 1990s and 2000s, providing Russia with a new commercial 
fishery in 2004. As a commercial species, crab from the Barents Sea has provided only 10% of Russia’s crab on average. Yet, this 
consists mostly of red king crab; therefore, the Barents Sea is a substantial source of Russian-origin red king crab (see Table 2). 
As the Barents Sea commercial red king crab fishery ramped up in the 2000s, red king crab abundance in the RFE declined 
significantly. However, these did not balance each other out. Overall, Russia’s nationwide TAC for red king crab fell by 82% between 
2000 and 2010 (32,560 mt [71.8 million lbs.] in 2000 compared to 5,828 mt [12.8 million lbs.] in 2010). 
A second invasive crab species has recently become the target of a new fishery in the Barents Sea: snow crab. In 2011, for the 
first time in history, the Russian Federal Fishery Agency issued a snow crab (Chionoecetes opilio) TAC of 1 mt in the Barents Sea for 
research purposes. By 2014, Barents Sea snow crab was commercially harvested under an initial TAC of 1,100 mt (2.4 million lbs.). 
The Barents Sea now has two introduced crab species that have grown to levels high enough to allow for commercial harvesting.  
The conservation threat associated with invasive red king and snow crab in the Barents Sea is related to disturbing the native food 
web and ecosystem, and not related to unsustainable harvesting practices. Red king crab spread west from Russian waters and 
invaded Norway’s fjords. The crab are devouring benthic organisms including capelin and lumpfish eggs and commercially valuable 
scallops; eating cod from long line gear; tangling up gillnets; and potentially spreading a blood parasite to fish. Effects of the red king 
crab invasion and population explosion are more intense in the steep fjords of Norway than the more gently sloping Russian Barents 
Sea, but the reasons for that are not currently understood. Russian fisheries managers are intent on sustaining these invasive crab 
populations for long-term harvesting, while Norwegian fishery managers view the invasive crab with more caution since long-term 
impacts to native species, traditional fisheries and the marine ecosystem are largely unknown. 
Sources: Fisheries.no (n.d.), Institute of Marine Research (2013), Barents Observer (2014), Sundet (2014)
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2014 RUSSIAN TAC BY FISHING SUB-ZONE AND BY PERCENT KING AND SNOW CRAB SPECIES
Data sources: Russian Federal Fishery Agency –TAC (2014), TINRO (2014, 105)
Fishing Harvest Zone numbers cor espond t  map in Figure 2.
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Russia’s Crab Trade and  
IUU Prevention Efforts
Photo courtesy of Josh Thomas
The Beginning of Russia’s Illegal 
Crab Industry
Russia’s	domestic	demand	for	crab	products	in	any	form	is	
minimal.9	Thus,	the	principle	goal	for	the	Russian	crab	indus-
try	is	to	export	crab	for	sale	in	foreign	markets	where	demand	
is	high.	Prior	to	1991,	during	the	Soviet	period,	fishing	was	
highly	regulated	and	the	fishing	industry	was	tightly	controlled.	
However,	beginning	in	the	early	1990s	with	the	break-up	of	the	
Soviet	Union,	the	newly	formed	Russian	government	was	unable	
to	effectively	control	and	enforce	fisheries	management	within	its	
territorial	waters.	Due	to	weak	domestic	governance	and	enforce-
ment	as	well	as	the	high	international	demand	for	Russian	crab,	
9	Recently,	in	Moscow,	St.	Petersburg	and	some	RFE	markets	there	has	been	an	
observed	increase	in	demand	for	products	made	from	crab	around	New	Year’s	
Eve.		Nevertheless,	overall	domestic	demand	for	crab	continues	to	be	low	due	to	
product	availability	and	high	price.
there	was	an	explosion	of	illegal,	unreported	and	unregulated	
fishing	for	crab	within	Russia’s	territorial	waters	(Newell	2004).
Methods of Illegal Crabbing
Once	harvested,	illegal	crab	is	then	laundered	to	appear	that	it	
has	legal	origin.	Known	techniques	for	laundering	illegal	crab	
include	misdeclaring	quantities,	mislabeling	products,	creating	
false	documentation,	and	bribery.	There	are	many	anecdotal	
stories	and	news	reports	on	specific	instances	of	how	illegal	crab	
fishing	takes	place.	There	appear	to	be	two	primary	methods	for	
harvest	and	transport:10 
1)		 by	Russian-flagged	vessels,	which	harvest	more	than	their	
legal	quota.	They	can	either	(intentionally	or	unintention-
ally)	misdeclare	their	product,	off-load	undeclared	product	
onto	a	transport	vessel	at	sea,	or	deliver	undeclared	crab	
directly	to	a	foreign	port	(See	Box	4);	or
2)		 by	a	vessel	that	does	not	have	legal	rights	to	harvest	
crab	but	does	so	anyway.	Vessels	in	this	category	can	be	
owned,	operated	or	flagged	by	Russia,	or	they	could	be	a	
foreign-flagged	vessel.	Russia	does	not	give	out	permits	or	
quotas	for	crab	harvesting	to	any	foreign-flagged	vessels	in	
its	Exclusive	Economic	Zone	(EEZ)	(See	Boxes	5	and	6).
10	Russian	crab	is	caught	live	and	can	either	be	stored	within	a	vessel’s	hold	
for	two	to	four	weeks,	or	be	frozen	onboard	a	vessel	(with	or	without	first	flash	
cooking).	Even	with	recirculating	water	in	the	vessel’s	hold	(common	on	Russian	
and	U.S.	vessels),	there	is	some	standard	loss	due	to	crab	dying	when	live	crab	are	
held	in	tanks	onboard	a	vessel.
SECTION HIGHLIGHTS
Illegal crab is harvested by foreign-flagged vessels and some 
Russian-flagged vessels, yet it is unclear which set of vessels 
is the greater contributor to illegal harvest amounts. Russia 
has implemented laws and developed a National Action 
Plan to address IUU in an attempt to gain control over the 
criminal activity in Russian Far East waters.   
Emptying snow 
crab from a pot.
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BOX 4
RUSSIAN-FLAGGED VESSELS CITED FOR 
ILLEGAL CRAB HARVESTING
April 2014 – Sea of Okhotsk  A freezer trawler vessel, 
Kamchatka Salmon, chartered for scientific research by the 
government-run Kamchatka Research Institute of Fisheries 
and Oceanography (KamchatNIRO) was inspected and 
impounded in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatksy to await trial for 
illegal crab harvesting. The Russian-flagged and crewed 
vessel had 27 mt (59,525 lbs.) of blue king crab and 13.5 mt 
(29,762 lbs.) of additional crab products in unmarked boxes 
on board. Crab, vessel and fishing documents were seized. 
Both the captain of the vessel and KamchatNIRO were cited 
in violation of harvesting aquatic biological resources. If 
found guilty, KamchatNIRO faces administrative penalties 
and vessel confiscation.  Source: Fishkamchatka (2014a)
March 2014 – Barents Sea  Lovozero district court in the 
Murmansk Region, found the captain of the Russian-flagged 
vessel Angel guilty of overharvesting at least 1,344 individual 
red king crabs with a value, including damages, of 1,122,240 
rubles ($33,281) in the Barents Sea. The vessel’s captain is 
required to compensate the federal budget in full as well as 
pay an additional fine of 100,000 rubles ($2,965).   
Source: Regnum News (2014b)
January 2014 – Sea of Okhotsk  The Russian-flagged freezer 
trawler Andrey Smirnov was detained for possessing illegal 
crab. Border patrol inspectors found 4.1 mt (9,039 lbs.) of 
processed blue king crab on board the Andrey Smirnov. The 
captain of the vessel was cited in violation of harvesting 
aquatic biological resources and if found guilty would face 
administrative penalties as well as vessel confiscation. The 
Andrey Smirnov was seized previously by Russia’s federal 
authorities in October 2012 after border guards found 40 
mt (80,000 lbs.) of undocumented frozen cooked crab legs. 
Additionally, border guards determined that the vessel had 
disabled its positioning system for a few days, and thus 
authorities were unsure where the crab had been harvested. 
Source: Interfax Russia (2012), Primamedia (2014a)
BOX 5
FOREIGN-FLAGGED VESSELS POACHING 
CRAB IN RUSSIA’S FAR EAST 
September 2014 – A vessel flagged in the Republic of 
Togo named Katraps attempted to evade a Russian Border 
Patrol vessel. Katraps was unmarked, unresponsive to radio 
contact, failed to broadcast anti-collision signals and raced 
away from the Border Patrol. Upon inspection, Katraps 
contained fragments of crab, was equipped to transport 
live crab, yet had no documentation or permission to fish 
within the Russia’s EEZ. Katraps was crewed by 13 people 
– 11 Russians and 2 Ukrainians – and the ship owner was 
registered in Belize. The vessel was impounded in the port of 
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky.  Source: Fishkamchatka (2014b)
May 2014 – In the Sea of Okhotsk, the Russian Border Guard 
detained the Belize-owned, Cambodian-flagged vessel Olkhon 
carrying crab, crab-harvesting gear, and a crew of 16 Russians 
and two Indonesians. Olkhon had no documents entitling 
them to harvest any other fish species in Russia’s EEZ, nor 
were authorities notified when the vessel entered Russian 
waters. The vessel was escorted to the port of Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatsky for trial for violating laws governing the 
production of living aquatic resources and protection of 
fisheries.  Source: Border Guard of Kamchatka Krai (2014) 
February 2014 – The fishing vessel Satsunan, sailing under 
the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis, fled from a Russian Border 
Guard vessel and helicopter for over two hours, all the while 
the Russian and Ukrainian crewmembers dumped crab 
overboard in the Cape Mosolov area off Primorsky Krai. Once 
apprehended, 200 kg (441 lbs.) of opilio snow crab were 
found, the freezers were full of frozen herring crab bait, and 
the Satsunan captain was identified as a repeat offender of 
illegal fishing offenses. The Satsunan was escorted to the port 
of Nakhodka.  Source: Russian News (2014)
November 2013 – Russian Border Service division of the 
Federal Security Service (FSB) shot at and stopped the 
Cambodian-flagged vessel Iskander from fleeing Russia’s EEZ. 
The vessel’s crew were visibly throwing crab over the deck 
during the chase. The crew consisted of 14 Russian citizens 
and four Indonesian nationals. The vessel was also equipped 
for harvest and transport of crab and carried frozen herring, 
common crab bait. Source: RIA News (2013b)
October 2013 – The Russian Border Guard nabbed the 
Belize-flagged vessel Freedom for illegally harvesting, storing 
and transporting 10,501 live crabs (15 mt or 33,069 lbs.). The 
Russian captain pled guilty in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky city 
court, and was sentenced to two years in jail and was required 
to relinquish his captain’s license for four years. However, in 
January 2014, the Kamchatka prosecutor gave the Freedom’s 
captain total amnesty and released him from jail, citing the 
20th anniversary of the Russian Federation’s Constitution as 
the reason. The vessel owner, a company named “Benefit 
Limited,” was ordered to pay a fine of twice the value of the 
catch and the costs—a total of more than 12 million rubles 
($344,000)—and the vessel Freedom was seized by officials. 
Sources: Regnum News (2014a, 2014c), My Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy 
News (2014), KamInform (2014)
King crab shoulder and legs for sale in a Russian  
seafood market. © WWF-US / Heather Brandon
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Current Russian Measures to 
Deter Illegal Crabbing
By	the	mid-2000s,	overexploitation	of	crab	from	Russia’s	Far	
East	waters	was	widespread.	This	fishing	pressure	diminished	
stocks	of	red	king	crab	and	other	crab	species,	causing	a	deficit,	
which	severely	impacted	Russia’s	legal	crab	industry.	Beginning	
in	2007,	in	an	attempt	to	establish	stronger	state	control	over	
the	illegal	crab	industry,	the	Russian	government	began	to	
implement	a	series	of	measures	that	were	intended	to	curb	
illegal	harvesting	of	crab	(see	Timeline	below).
In	mid-2007,	Russia	banned	the	export	of	live	crab	of	all	species	
caught	in	Russia’s	EEZ,	a	move	it	would	rescind	in	2011	in	
part	due	to	the	unintended	and	undesirable	incentives	it	gave	
to	increase	crab	poaching	(Agrobel	2007;	Jinji	2007;	Russian	
Federal	Fishery	Agency2011).	In	December	2008,	Russian	Law	
No.	250	–F3	mandated	all	vessels	fishing	within	its	EEZ	wish-
ing	to	export	their	catch	to	return	first	to	a	Russian	port	to	have	
their	export	documentation	filled	out,	checked	and	filed.11
In	addition	to	these	export	requirements,	around	this	time	the	
Russian	government	began	discussing	bilateral	agreements	with	
the	main	importing	countries	of	Russian	crab:	Japan,	South	
Korea,	China	and	the	United	States.	Bilateral	agreements	now	
have	been	signed	between	Russia	and	Japan,	China	and	South	
Korea.	The	status	of	these	bilateral	agreements	is	given	below.		
Russia	and	the	U.S.	have	been	discussing	an	IUU	agreement	for	
several	years,	and	in	September	2014	the	agreement	language	
was	finalized	in	a	closed	meeting	between	the	two	countries.	
 
11	As	is	customary	in	Russia,	after	a	law	is	initially	signed	and	then	published	in	
the	Rossyiskaya Gazeta,	it	becomes	official	and	enforceable,	and	thus	the	Russian	
port	landing	requirement	went	into	effect	December	9,	2008.	See	Rossiskaya 
Gazeta	(2008).
In	December	2013,	the	Russian	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	under	
the	Fishing	Industry	Development	Federal	Program,	approved	a	
National	Action	Plan	to	prevent	IUU	fishing. 12	According	to	the	
Russian	Government	(2013),	the	National	Action	Plan	prescribes	
the	following	steps	that	Russia	should	take	in	order	to	“eliminate	
the	causes	and	the	conditions	that	contribute	to	the	development	
and	growth	of	illegal,	unreported,	and	unregulated	fishing:
•	 analyze	Russian	legislation	for	compliance	with	interna-
tional	law	and	submit	proposals	for	optimizing	it	to	the	
government,	in	particular,	to	ensure	the	regulation	of	the	
acceptance,	loading,	transportation,	storage	and	unloading	
of	biological	water	resources;	to	regulate	the	procedure	for	
chartering	fishing	vessels;	to	inspect	vessels	that	sail	under	
foreign	flags	in	Russian	seaports;	and	to	properly	mark	
fishing	vessels	and	fishing	equipment;
•	 strengthen	control	over	biological	water	resource	trade;
•	 create	a	system	to	monitor	the	origin	of	biological	water	
resources	at	all	stages	of	their	moving;
•	 introduce	electronic	log	books	and	e-signatures	for	fishing	
vessel	captains;
•	 take	measures	to	prevent	Russian	nationals	from	par-
ticipating	in	illegal,	unreported,	and	regulated	fishing	or	
supporting	it;
•	 develop	international	cooperation	in	preventing	illegal,	
unreported	and	unregulated	fishing	and	illegal	biological	
water	resource	trade;
•	 strengthen	administrative	and	criminal	punishment	for	
the	violators	of	Russian	legislation	on	fishing	and	on	the	
preservation	of	biological	water	resources;
•	 take	regular	preventative	measures	to	expose	and	stop	the	
illegal	production	of	biological	water	resources.”
12	National	plans	of	action	to	prevent,	deter	and	eliminate	IUU	Fishing	are	called	
for	by	the	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization	(FAO)	International	Plan	for	the	
same,	adopted	by	FAO	member	States	in	2001.	Virtually	all	of	the	provisions	in	
Russia’s	National	Plan	are	called	for	in	the	International	Plan.	The	international	
plans	were	supposed	to	be	done	in	2004,	although	many	countries	still	are	
working	on	them.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2010 2013 2014 2015 
2007	  –	  Russian	  Federa-on	  bans	  
export	  of	  live	  crabs	  outside	  of	  
its	  EEZ	  for	  the	  Far	  East	  basin	  
December	  2008–	  Russian	  Law	  No.	  
250-­‐F3	  passes	  which	  requires	  vessels	  
ﬁshing	  within	  Russia’s	  EEZ	  to	  return	  to	  
a	  Russian	  port	  in	  order	  to	  have	  export	  
documenta-on	  ﬁlled	  out	  and	  checked	  
April	  2014–	  Russian-­‐
Japanese	  bilateral	  	  IUU	  
agreement	  comes	  into	  
eﬀect	  (signed	  
September	  2012)	  	  	  
2011	  –	  Russian	  Federa-on	  
liQs	  ban	  on	  transpor-ng	  
live	  crabs	  outside	  of	  its	  EEZ	  
December	  2013	  –	  Russian	  
Federa-on	  approves	  
‘Na-onal	  Ac-on	  Plan	  to	  
Prevent	  IUU	  Fishing’	  
May	  2013–Russia	  nego-ates	  with	  South	  
Korea	  to	  allow	  South	  Korea	  a	  higher	  
pollock	  quota	  for	  2014	  if	  South	  Korea	  
takes	  	  concrete	  measures	  to	  prevent	  
illegally	  harvested	  Russian	  crab	  from	  
entering	  Korean	  ports	  
December	  2009	  –Russia	  
and	  South	  Korea	  sign	  
bilateral	  IUU	  agreement	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BOX 6
AIS SIGNALS SHOW POSSIBLE ILLEGAL ACTIVITY BY BOTH FOREIGN AND RUSSIAN VESSELS
WWF’s Smart Fishing Initiative and Navama* examined the Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals for 32 vessels believed to have 
delivered crab to Hokkaido, Japan in early 2012. Twenty-five vessels were foreign-flagged, and of those 25 only six broadcast AIS. Failing 
to broadcast an AIS signal is not illegal, but some vessels could be attempting to intentionally avoid detection. Of those six foreign-flagged 
vessels with AIS turned on, two vessels showed a pattern that indicated harvesting in Russian waters, and three approached  the Russia-
Japan maritime border, which could indicate transshipment. 
WWF and Navama were not able to determine patterns for the other 19 vessels because the AIS signals were not broadcast. Seven of the 
32 vessels investigated by WWF and Navama were Russian-flagged vessels. All seven Russian-flagged vessels broadcast AIS signals. The AIS 
signals indicated that five out of the seven Russian-flagged vessels showed a pattern of possible harvesting in Russian waters. Additionally, 
patterns also showed direct transit of these vessels to ports in Japan without stopping in a Russian port first to register the catch, therefore 
potentially violating Russian law (if crab or other seafood harvested from Russian waters was off-loaded in Japan).  WWF and Navama were 
not able to ascertain the comparative volume of crab removals conducted by Russian-flagged illegal harvesters versus foreign-flagged 
illegal harvesters.  
In 2014, TINRO noted “the quantity of vessels flagged by a third country, which illegally fished for crab in Russian waters and then landed 
their product in Japan or South Korea, had considerably decreased as a result of the actions of the Federal Marine Inspection and Border 
Service” (TINRO 2014, 105). However, WWF was unable to find additional enforcement information with respect to foreign-flagged vessels 
that could support or dispute this claim.
*Navama is a Germany-based technology company dedicated to nature conservation. See http://navama.com 
Photo courtesy of Josh Thomas
For	Russia,	this	necessary,	yet	ambitious,	set	of	domestic	
goals	represents	an	important	step	for	a	government	that	has	
recognized	the	corruption	and	widespread	illegal	activity	in	its	
fisheries	sector	for	years	and	has	failed	to	bring	about	signifi-
cant	changes	until	recently.	
In	February	and	March	2014,	government	officials	from	the	
Ministries	of	Agriculture,	Fisheries,	Development	of	the	Far	
East,	and	Federal	Service	for	Veterinary	and	Phytosanitary	
Surveillance	led	a	series	of	meetings	with	local	Far	East	
administrators	and	representatives	of	seafood	businesses	in	
Vladivostok	to	develop	practical	measures	for	several	of	the	
aforementioned	goals.	The	agencies	agreed	that	an	initial	
necessary	step	was	to	develop	cooperative	joint	measures	in	
order	to	achieve	traceability	of	fish	and	seafood	products.	
One	initiative	discussed	was	the	introduction	of	electronic	
“veterinary”	certifications	that	would	provide	full	traceabil-
ity	of	the	supply	chain	from	sea	to	consumer	(Primamedia	
2014b).	Officials	at	the	meetings	also	discussed	the	need	
for	the	Russian	Federal	Fishery	Agency	to	partner	with	law	
enforcement	agencies	and	other	authorities	to	conduct	audits	
of	all	transportation	routes,	places	of	storage	and	processing	
locations	of	fish	and	seafood	(Russian	Ministry	of	Agriculture	
2014).	Nikolai	Fyodorov,	the	head	of	Russia’s	Ministry	of	
Agriculture,	noted	“it	is	necessary	to	organize	and	display	
our	work	so	that	the	general	perception	of	Russian	authority,	
fisherman,	and	the	image	of	the	entire	industry	as	‘one	of	the	
most	criminalized	sectors’	is	left	behind	and	a	new	image	of	
fisherman	is	perceived	by	the	public”	(Ibid.,	para.	11).
Snow crab.
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Partner Country Trade Information  
and IUU Bilateral Initiatives
Russia’s	four	main	foreign	markets	for	crab	are	Japan,	South	
Korea,	the	United	States	and	China	(see	Figure	6).	The	market	
demand	for	Russian	crab	differs	in	each	country,	as	does	each	
country’s	bilateral	initiative	with	Russia	to	decrease	the	supply	
of	illegal	crab.	The	following	sub-sections	describe	trade	with	
and	between	each	of	Russia’s	four	main	crab	trade	partners.
South Korea
South	Korea’s	port	city	of	Busan	is	a	hub	for	Russian	crab	deliv-
eries	and	stop-overs,	both	legal	and	illegal.	Indeed,	the	Russian	
government’s	official	newspaper	periodically	covers	instances	
of	illegal	crab	uncovered	by	authorities	in	Busan	(See	Box	
7).	Russian	and	South	Korean	trade	data	from	1999	to	2008	
indicate	a	pattern—official	Russian	exports	are	far	below	South	
Korean	imports.	Yet,	beginning	in	2009,	this	trend	reversed	
and	Russia’s	official	exports	to	South	Korea	far	exceeded	official	
Korean	imports.	Figure	7	shows	officially	reported	customs	
trade	data	for	Russia’s	trade	with	South	Korea	and	the	United	
States.	Such	an	uncharacteristic	trade	discrepancy	(including	
the	immediate	and	drastic	reversal	of	reported	trade	volumes)	
warrants	further	discussion.	
In	late	2008,	Russia	mandated	that	all	catch	on	board	a	vessel,	
including	crab,	must	be	checked	in	a	Russian	port	for	customs	
clearance	and	documentation.	This	increased	the	chances	that	
Russia’s	official	exports	to	South	Korea	began	to	reflect	the	
real	quantities	of	legal	exports	that	had	probably	always	been	
exported	from	Russia	but	had	not	been	registered	officially	by	
Russian	Customs	(note	that	prior	to	2009,	Russian	Customs	
consistently	reported	negligible	exports	to	all	its	trade	partners;	
see	Figure	1).13 
However,	with	Russia’s	new	port	landing	requirement	to	have	
export	documentation	checked	and	filed,	Russia’s	official	export	
data	did	not	increase	to	an	approximate	level	equal	to	that	of	
South	Korea’s	officially	reported	imports	from	Russia.	Instead,	
Russia’s	post-2008	export	volumes	indicate	that	Russia	regis-
tered	higher	volumes	of	crab	exports	than	South	Korea	reported	
importing.	This	could	be	due	to	the	fact	that	U.S.	imports	of	
Russian	crab	list	one	of	several	Asian	ports	as	intermediate	stops,	
with	Busan,	South	Korea	appearing	often	in	U.S.	Customs	data.	
Russian	Customs	likely	registers	crab	as	exported	to	South	
Korea,	but	South	Korea	is	merely	a	stop-off	port	for	crab	that	
is	ultimately	going	to	the	U.S.,	and	South	Korean	Customs	
does	not	register	the	crab	as	official	imports.	Meanwhile,	U.S.	
Customs	might	indicate	the	same	crab	(that	Russia	says	it	
exports	to	South	Korea)	as	U.S.	imports	from	Russia,	not	South	
Korea.	The	practice	of	goods	stopping	off	in	various	ports	is	
not	illegal,	yet	the	practice	provides	opportunity	for	mixing	or	
laundering	illegal	crab.	
13	Since	Russia’s	actual	extent	of	exports	of	crab	were	not	reported	by	Russian	
Customs	until	2009,	this	indicates	that	up	until	then	the	Russian	government	also	
had	foregone	collecting	any	export	taxes	or	fees	associated	with	its	lucrative	crab	
exports.
SECTION HIGHLIGHTS
Russia’s main trade partners for 
crab—South Korea, Japan, United 
States and China—have each 
attempted to address the crab 
IUU problem in a unilateral or 
bilateral manner. The complexity 
of crab trade routes indicates that 
a multilateral effort would provide 
the most comprehensive approach 
for blocking illegal crab from 
entering the global market.    
Entrance to Avacha Bay, 
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii, Russia.
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It	is	unknown	whether	these	intermediate	stop-overs	in	South	
Korea	are	simply	for	transport	vessels	to	re-fuel,	and	the	crab	
never	leaves	the	vessel,	or	whether	the	stop-overs	involve	
processing,	packaging,	labeling	or	other	handling,	all	of	which	
could	provide	opportunities	to	either	mix,	mislabel	or	other-
wise	launder	illegal	crab	into	shipments	of	legal	crab	before	
the	product	continues	on	to	a	final	destination	(See	Trade	
Complexity	for	further	discussion).		Box	7	highlights	an	exam-
ple	covered	by	Russian	media	of	methods	used	to	transship	
illegally	harvested	Russian	crab	to	South	Korea.			
To	address	the	illegal	crab	trade,	South	Korea	and	Russia	
signed	the	first	bilateral	intergovernmental	agreement	designed	
to	prevent	illegal	seafood	entering	foreign	ports	in	2009.14  
Unfortunately,	according	to	Russia’s	TINRO	Center	(2014),	the	
bilateral	agreement	has	proven	largely	ineffective	(See	Box	8).		
For	example,	TINRO	noted	in	its	‘Crab	Forecast	2014’:
“At	a	Russian-Korean	consultation	on	the	implemen-
tation	of	the	“Agreement	with	Korea”	in	the	middle	of	
November	2012,	the	Korean	side	informed	the	Russian	
delegation	that	they	found	warehouses	in	South	Korea	
with	at	least	6,000	metric	tons	of	crab	[13.2	million	lbs.],	
which	up	until	that	time	had	not	been	counted	at	all	as	
imports	from	any	country	in	the	world”	(2014,	110).	
14	The	agreement	was	signed	on	22	December	2009	(entered	into	effect	22	
June	2010)	and	is	titled	“Agreement	between	the	Governments	of	the	Russian	
Federation	and	the	Republic	of	Korea	on	the	partnership	to	eradicate	illegal,	
undocumented,	and	unregulated	fishing	of	living	marine	resources.”	
Sources: Data – Global Trade Atlas (2014), Crab picture – © Hartmut Jungius / WWF – Canon
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BOX 7
EXAMPLE OF ILLEGAL TRANSHIPMENT 
FROM RUSSIA TO SOUTH KOREA
 
April 2013 - Russian authorities in the Magadan city court 
imposed fines on joint-stock company ‘Hayryuzovsky RKZ-1’ 
for illegally transshipping more than 50 mt (110,231 lbs.) of 
blue king crab from Russian waters to South Korea. The king 
crab was harvested by vessel Solomon, then transferred to 
another vessel Dezhnyovo, a refrigerated seiner-trawler, where 
the crab was then processed, flash cooked, frozen and finally 
transferred to the refrigerated tramper vessel Buzanski, which 
delivered the crab to Busan, South Korea. The fines imposed 
on the Russian company exceeded 2.5 million rubles ($ 74,000), 
but federal authorities only received 700,000 rubles ($ 20,000).    
Source: KamInform (2013) 
Russian	and	Korean	authorities	continue	to	discuss	the	problem	
and	potential	solutions	(Fishnews	2013a).	In	March	2013,	
South	Korean	representatives	observed	that	crab	was	still	
illegally	imported	into	South	Korean	ports	without	the	required	
Russian	documentation.	Yet	South	Korea	skirted	responsi-
bility	by	suggesting	that	there	are	individuals	and	groups	in	
Russia	that	benefit	from	illegal	crab	fishing	and	that	a	unified	
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system	throughout	the	Pacific	Rim	for	all	importing	countries	
would	be	the	only	effective	method	to	solve	the	crab	poach-
ing	problem	(see	Recommendations)(Vietnam	Seafood	Trade	
2013).15 	Between	April	and	May	2013,	during	the	fourth	and	
fifth	rounds	of	bilateral	negotiations	between	Russia	and	South	
Korea	(which	occurred	after	South	Korea	had	acknowledged	
that	large	volumes	of	illegal	crab	were	still	being	landed	in	their	
ports)	Russia	tried	a	different	tactic—it	halved	the	size	of	South	
Korea’s	quota	to	fish	for	pollock	in	Russia’s	EEZ	and	tied	any	
increases	in	quota	volume	to	certain	conditions	South	Korea	
would	have	to	meet	related	to	increasing	compliance	with	and	
enforcement	of	crab	landings	documentation	requirements	
(Undercurrent	News	2013a;	2013c).		
Japan
Japan	is	the	leading	importer	of	crab	from	Russia,	both	live	and	
frozen,	likely	due	to	Japanese	domestic	demand	and	the	close	
proximity	of	Japan’s	northern	ports	to	Russia’s	EEZ,	and	par-
ticularly	to	the	Russian	fishing	sub-zones,	which	contain	crab	
stocks.16		Comparing	official	Russian	exports	of	crab	to	Japan	to	
official	Japanese	imports	of	crab	from	Russia	exposes	a	major	
trade	discrepancy	(Figure	8).		Russia	registers	a	small	amount	
of	crab	as	exported	to	Japan,	yet	Japan’s	imports	of	Russian	
crab	are	consistently	many	times	higher.	
In	late	2008,	Russia	instituted	a	new	landing	requirement	that	
should	have	significantly	improved	its	reporting	of	crab	exports	
and	narrowed	this	trade	discrepancy.	However,	between	2009	
15	For	shared	stocks	like	crab,	other	regions	have	successfully	used	a	harmonized	
regional	approach,	e.g.,	the	spiny	lobster	in	Central	America,	which	goes	beyond	
harmonized	codes	and	includes	uniform	legal	requirements	across	countries.
16	For	instance,	the	Hokkaido	Island	ports	of	Wakkanai,	Otaru,	and	Mombetsu.
BOX 8
KING CRAB SMUGGLING CHANNEL 
(RUSSIA TO JAPAN TO SOUTH KOREA)
BUSTED
November 2012 — In the port city of Busan, South Korean 
police suppressed a channel through which large quantities 
of Russian king crab were smuggled. South Korean authorities 
cited that they arrested criminals who controlled up to 90% 
of deliveries of Russian king crab to the South Korean market. 
The extensive police investigation involved three companies 
registered in Sierra Leone and one South Korean importer, 
with South Korean nationals as the heads of all of these 
companies. According to investigation documents, for the first 
seven months of 2012, the criminals imported more than 728 
mt (1,604,965 lbs.) of red king crab, which enabled the criminal 
channel to reap 23.3 billion won ($21 million). According to 
South Korean law, offenders face prison sentences of up to five 
years and fines up to 100 million won ($92,000). 
South Korean police determined that the crab had been 
illegally fished in Russian waters by foreign-flagged vessels 
that employed Russians on board, and then delivered the 
crab directly to Japan, where it was laundered with forged 
documents. The “legalized” crab was then officially imported by 
South Korea.  Source: Rossiskaya Gazeta (2012) 
FIGURE 7
RUSSIAN EXPORTS AND KOREAN AND U.S. IMPORTS OF RUSSIAN CRAB, 1999–2013 
Data source: Global Trade Atlas (2014)
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and	2013,	Japan’s	imports	of	Russian	crab	were,	on	average,	15	
times	higher	than	Russia’s	reported	crab	exports	to	Japan. 17		While	
trade	discrepancies	occur	frequently	(see	Estimation	of	Crab	IUU),	
this	consistently	large	discrepancy	warrants	further	investigation,	
because	trade	discrepancies	may	be	attributed	to	illegal	product	
flow,	for	example,	if	crab	was	laundered	either	before	or	upon	
entering	Japan.	
Interestingly,	Russia’s	2008	port-landing	requirement	
does	not	appear	to	correspond	to	any	substantial	change	in	
Japanese-Russian	bilateral	trade	data,	as	was	seen	in	the	South	
Korea-Russian	trade	data.	While	Russia’s	registered	crab	
exports	to	Japan	did	increase	nine-fold	from	approximately	
600	mt	(1.3	million	lbs.)	in	2008	to	5,800	mt	(12.8	million	lbs.)	
in	2009,	it	pales	in	comparison	to	Japan’s	reported	imports	
from	Russia	for	those	years,	which	in	2008	was	70,000	mt	
(154	million	lbs.)	and	in	2009	was	60,000	mt	(132	million	
lbs.).		Between	those	same	two	years	(2008-2009),	Russia-
South	Korea	trade	data	indicate	that	Russia’s	reported	exports	
to	South	Korea	increased	from	approximately	1,000	mt	to	
22,000	mt	(2.2	million	to	48.5	million	lbs.)–a	twenty-two-fold	
increase,	while	South	Korea’s	imports	only	marginally	increased	
from	13.7	thousand	mt	to	16.3	thousand	mt	(from	30	million	to	
35.9	million	lbs.)	.	One	possible	explanation	for	why	Russia’s	
late	2008	port	landing	requirement	is	seen	so	dramatically	in	
Russia’s	exports	to	South	Korea,	but	not	in	Russia’s	exports	
to	Japan,	could	be	that	most	of	Japan’s	imports	of	crab	from	
Russia	are,	in	fact,	illegally	sourced	from	Russian	waters	and	
were	delivered	straight	to	Japanese	ports	without	Russian	
authorization.18
17	The	most	recent	reported	year	in	trade	data	statistics,	2013,	indicated	that	
Japan’s	crab	imports	were	20	times	higher	than	Russia’s	exports	of	crab	to	Japan.
18	This	is	not	to	say	that	all	of	Russia’s	exports	to	South	Korea	were	legal.	
As	media	reports	(Boxes	7	and	8)	indicate,	there	are	high	volumes	of	illegally	
sourced	Russian	crab	landing	in	South	Korea,	too. 
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In	2012,	Japan	and	Russia	signed	a	bilateral	agreement	on	IUU. 19  
This	agreement	was	exclusively	directed	toward	the	prevention	
of	illegal	harvesting	and	trade	of	illegal	Russian	crab	into	Japan	
(TINRO	2014).		Although	signed	in	2012,	the	agreement	did	
not	enter	into	force	until	April	2014.	Because	two	years	passed	
between	the	signing	and	implementation	of	the	agreement,	with	
many	postponed	implementation	start	dates,	several	U.S.	and	
Russian	news	sources	reported	that	illegal	crab	deliveries	to	
Japan	were	heightened	between	2012	and	2014,	and	that	illegal	
crab	flow	would	begin	to	shift	to	other	countries	with	less	strin-
gent	import	requirements	as	a	result	of	impending	Japanese	
enforcement	(RIA	News	2013a;	Undercurrent	News	2014a;	
Stopcrabmafia	2014).20	In	addition,	since	April	2014,	there	have	
been	reports	of	increased	instances	of	Russian	vessels	poaching	
crab	in	Japan’s	EEZ,	which	indicates	that	Russian	“vessels	are	
apparently	trying	to	shift	fishing	grounds	for	illegal	catch	into	
Japanese	EEZ	in	an	apparent	bid	to	circumvent	the	reinforced	
surveillance	by	the	Russian	border	police”	(Seafood	News	2014;	
see	also	Legal	Information	Service	2014).		
In	September	2014,	as	part	of	the	implementation	of	their	
bilateral	agreement	and	to	harmonize	their	import	and	export	
procedures,	Russia	and	Japan	agreed	upon	mandating	that	
legality	certificates	accompany	live	crab	imports	into	Japanese	
ports.	Certificates	of	legality	will	be	mandated	beginning	
December	10,	2014	(Fishkamchatka	2014c).	Despite	the	fact	
that	the	extent	to	which	various	steps	taken	by	Russia	and	
Japan	to	implement	their	bilateral	agreement	cannot	be	evalu-
ated	fully,	the	progress	that	Russia	and	Japan	have	made	since	
April	2014	indicates	the	willingness	of	both	governments	to	
tackle	the	illegal	crab	trade	between	the	two	countries.
19	In	September	2012,	during	the	Asia-Pacific	Economic	Cooperation	(APEC)	
Summit	in	Vladivostok,	Russia	and	Japan	signed	the	“Agreement	between	the	
Government	of	the	Russian	Federation	and	the	Government	of	Japan	on	the	
Protection,	Efficient	Use,	and	Management	of	Living	Resources	in	the	North	East	
part	of	the	Pacific	Ocean	and	the	Prevention	of	Illegal	Trade	of	Living	Resources.”
20	This	is	called	“displacement”	and	is	a	common	phenomenon	when	
enforcement	increases	in	one	place	and	remains	weak	elsewhere.
FIGURE 8
RUSSIAN EXPORTS AND JAPANESE IMPORTS OF RUSSIAN CRAB, 1999-2013
Data Source: Global Trade Atlas (2014)
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United States
While	Russian	crab	directly	competes	with	Alaskan	crab	on	
the	world	market	and	in	the	United	States,	legal	Russian	crab	
helps	maintain	the	supply	of	crab	to	the	global	market	(Figure	
9).	In	2012,	one	fifth	of	the	United	States’	imports	of	crab	came	
from	Russia,	yet	Russia	customs	data	indicate	no	exports	to	
the	U.S.	(Figure	7).	One	explanation	of	this	trade	discrepancy	
is	described	under	the	‘South	Korea’	heading	of	this	section:	
Russian	Customs	might	register	crab	as	exports	to	South	
Korea,	but	South	Korea	is	rather	a	stop-off	port	for	crab	that	
is	ultimately	going	to	the	U.S.	This	type	of	trade	is	sometimes	
referred	to	as	triangular	trade,	which	means	that	products	may	
stop-off	at	one	or	more	intermediate	ports	before	reaching	their	
final	destination.	
While	triangular	trade	is	a	legal	trade	practice	(with	no	
required	harmonization	of	customs	records	between	the	var-
ious	countries),	it	can	provide	opportunities	for	the	mixing	of	
legal	and	illegal	products	and	laundering	of	illegal	products.	
Furthermore,	another	plausible	explanation	for	some	of	the	
trade	discrepancy	is	that	part	of	U.S.	imported	Russian	crab	is	
illegal	(see	‘Trade	Complexity’	for	further	discussion).
If	illegal	Russian	crab	enters	the	U.S.	market,	it	reduces	the	
price	of	crab	in	the	United	States,	which	hurts	the	Alaska	crab	
industry	(APRN	2014;	Carlton	2013;	Hermann	and	Greenberg	
2006).	According	to	the	Alaska	Bering	Sea	Crabbers	(2014),	an	
industry	association	of	crab	harvesters,	Alaska	crabbers	have	
lost	an	estimated	$600	million	since	2000	due	to	the	compe-
tition	from	illegal	crab	on	the	global	and	American	markets.	
While	there	are	news	articles	about	Americans	who	might	col-
lude	to	import	illegal	Russian	crab	into	the	United	States	(Box	
9),	U.S.	consumers	of	king	and	snow	crab	are	likely	unaware	
they	might	be	purchasing	illegal	crab	and	unwittingly	contribut-
ing	to	perpetuating	these	illegal	activities.			
To	address	the	problem	of	illegal	Russian	crab,	the	Russian	
and	United	States	governments	have	conducted	official	
meetings	for	the	last	several	years	in	order	to	develop	a	U.S.-
Russian	bilateral	agreement	for	IUU,	which	would	specifically	
address	crab	as	well	as	other	seafood.	While	no	bilateral	agree-
ment	has	been	signed	between	the	two	countries	to	address	
IUU,	news	coverage	indicates	that	discussions	periodically	
take	place	(most	recently	in	September	2014	in	Vladivostok,	
Russia)	and	the	agreement	is	in	the	final	stages	of	develop-
ment	(Undercurrent	News	2013b;	Fishnews	2013b;	VNIRO	
2012;	NOAA	2011a).	
Despite	the	lack	of	a	specific	bilateral	agreement	between	the	two	
countries,	in	2013,	Russia	and	the	U.S.	signed	a	Joint	Statement	
that	is	not	legally	binding	but	does	allow	for	information	shar-
ing	regarding	the	biological	resources	of	the	Bering	Sea	more	
generally	(NOAA	2013).	Additionally,	the	U.S.	Department	of	
Commerce,	U.S.	Coast	Guard,	U.S.	
Department	of	Justice,	Department	of	
Homeland	Security,	U.S.	Department	
of	State	and	U.S.	Customs	and	Border	
Protection	have	worked	closely	with	
the	Russian	Coast	Guard	and	other	
Russian	enforcement	officials	to	help	
successfully	prosecute	cases	of	illegal	
crab	imports	under	the	U.S.	Lacey	Act	
(See	Box	2)	(NOAA	2011b).	Therefore,	
the	U.S.	and	Russia	have	successfully	
collaborated	in	the	past	on	specific	
investigations	and	enforcement	cases.	
While	the	Lacey	Act	has	resulted	
in	some	significant	convictions	for	
imports	of	illegally	caught	seafood,	the	
fact	is	that	prosecutors	rely	on	outside	
information	to	initiate	investigations,	
prosecutions	are	resource-intensive	
and	border	inspection	of	imports	are	
extremely	limited.21 22
Unfortunately,	overall	diplomatic	
relations	between	the	U.S.	and	Russia	have	recently	deteri-
orated		such	that	the	U.S.	Coast	Guard	(a	branch	of	the	U.S.	
military)	is	not	allowed	to	meet	with	their	Russian	counterparts.	
This	diplomatic	barrier	could	be	a	serious	detriment	to	joint	
IUU	enforcement	cooperation.	Fortunately,	other	U.S.	agencies	
are	currently	not	barred	from	communicating	or	meeting	with	
21	U.S.	Customs	and	Border	Patrol	officials	inspect	less	than	2%	of	all	imports	of	
seafood	and	these	inspections	focus	on	species	identification	and	food	safety,	not	
on	identifying	illegally	caught	fish.
22	As	noted	earlier,	the	2011	U.S.	Lacey	Act	case	against	Harbor	Seafood,	Inc.	
for	importing	$2.75	million	worth	of	Russian	crab	that	was	suspected	to	be	illegal	
into	the	United	States	represented	just	1.3%	of	the	U.S.’s	total	crab	imports	from	
Russia	in	2011.
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FIGURE 9
RED AND BLUE KING CRAB HARVEST, U.S. AND RUSSIA, 1970–1999
Source: Newell (2004, 53)
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Russian	colleagues,	and	discussions	of	the	bilateral	crab	IUU	
agreement	have	continued	to	progress.
China
China	plays	a	major	role	for	other	(non-crab)	seafood	imports	
from	Russia	(e.g.,	whitefish,	salmon)	and	is	heavily	involved	in	
re-processing	and	re-exporting	many	of	Russia’s	marine	species	
(Clarke	2009).	In	December	2012,	Russia	and	China	signed	a	
bilateral	agreement	to	cooperate	in	preventing,	deterring	and	
eliminating	IUU	fishing	and	trade	(Fishnews	2012;	Vietnam	
Association	2013).
However,	with	respect	to	crab,	only	five	percent	of	China’s	crab	
imports	come	directly	from	Russia	(3,800	mt	or	8.4	million	
lbs.,	with	a	value	of	$14	million	in	2012)	and	there	is	no	major	
trade	discrepancy	or	anecdotal	evidence	that	China	plays	a	big-
ger	role	than	official	customs	data	indicate.	The	extent	to	which	
illegal	Russian	crab	is	shipped	to	China,	either	via	direct	trade,	
or	via	re-exports	and	transshipments	is	not	discernable	from	
currently	available	trade	information.	
BOX 9
A HIGH PROFILE INSTANCE OF ALLEGED ILLEGAL RUSSIAN CRAB IMPORTATION TO THE U.S.
U.S. citizen and Bellevue, Washington resident Arkadi Gontmakher emigrated from Ukraine and in 1999 founded a U.S.-based import 
business called “Global Fishing” that became one of the top importers of Russian crab in the early 2000s.  According to the Seattle 
Times, “in 2002, Gontmakher was involved in an extended legal battle over more than 144,000 lbs. [ 65 mt] of Russian crab, seized 
by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) fishery agents in Blaine, because it allegedly had been caught and 
transported in violation of Russian law” (Seattle Times 2011a).  Nevertheless, Gontmakher’s company became the largest importer 
of Russian king crab into the U.S. and “sold $147 million in king crab to American consumers” in one year (Seattle Times 2011c).  In 
2006, Global Fishing’s imports of Russian king crab exceeded U.S. harvest of king crab in Alaska. 
The Seattle Times reported that Gontmakher became involved in another “high-profile criminal case that once reached from Moscow 
to Seattle, where the U.S. Attorney’s Office sought to gather evidence to help the Russian prosecution and in 2008 also launched its 
own grand-jury investigation of Gontmakher’s company.” (Seattle Times 2011a). 
In 2007, while on a business trip in Russia, Gontmakher was detained by authorities, incarcerated for more than three years, and 
charged with “conspiring with a Russian partner to import some 50 million pounds [22.7 thousand mt] of illegally caught crab, worth 
about $200 million, which was offloaded in South Korea and then shipped to the United States” (Seattle Times 2011a).  Gontmakher 
noted “I was buying all my crab from a seafood warehouse in South Korea—after the Russians caught it, pre-processed it and 
delivered it there, with proper customs declarations, acceptance certificates and other papers proving the origin and legality of the 
product. I didn’t have any crab fishing ships, I was only a wholesale buyer.” (CNN 2010). 
In December 2010, a 12-person jury in Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula unanimously acquitted Gontmakher. Less than one week 
later “he was charged with an almost identical set of criminal violations,” which, according to a Russian senior investigator, included 
“(laundering the profits from selling) crab products in 2006-2007 fished in Russia’s exclusive economic zone, without having proper 
permission.” (CNN 2010).
Gontmakher had health problems and due to this as well as petitions the Russian government received from U.S. Congressional 
officials, Russia agreed to release Gontmakher so that he could seek medical treatment in Moscow (Seattle Times 2011c). Upon 
release, he disregarded Russian orders to remain in Russia and escaped to the U.S. in mid-February 2011. The Seattle Times 
noted that while “the businessman maintained his innocence, Gontmakher also was secretly under criminal investigation by U.S. 
authorities, who sought to assist Russian prosecutors.” (2011c).  
For many Russians, Gontmakher remains in the public eye as he has subsequently sued Russian courts demanding financial compensation 
for the money he and his company lost as a result of his imprisonment in Russia. This issue remains sensitive in Russia, as the United States is 
seen as being complacent in its fight against illegal Russian crab entering the U.S. market. Sources: Seattle Times (2011a; 2011c), CNN (2010)
With	respect	to	the	possibility	that	China	plays	a	role	in	
laundering	Russian	crab	into	the	United	States	market	(either	
via	direct	or	triangular	trade),	the	United	States	does	import	
substantial	quantities	of	crab	from	China	($141	million	worth	
of	crab	in	2012),	most	of	which	was	processed	crab	meat.	Of	the	
$141	million	worth	of	U.S.	crab	imports	from	China	in	2012,	$1	
million	was	king	crab	(almost	all	as	frozen	crab	sections)	and	
$25.5	million	was	snow	crab	(one-quarter	of	that	was	frozen	
crab	sections,	while	the	rest	was	processed	and	canned).23 
In	the	same	year,	China’s	main	suppliers	of	frozen	crab	were	
Canada	(52%),	United	States	(25%),	Russia	(7%),	South	Korea	
(5%),	Chile	(2%),	and	Argentina	(1%);	therefore,	the	catch	loca-
tion	of	the	crab	that	the	U.S.	imports	from	China	is	unclear.24
23	The	remainder	(and	majority)	of	the	U.S.’s	$141	million	crab	imports	from	
China	in	2012	consisted	of	frozen	and	processed	crab	whose	species	are	listed	
within	HS	Codes	as	either	Chinese	swimming	crab,	any	crab	within	the	Callinectes 
genus,	or	totally	unspecified.
24	The	United	States	exports	large	volumes	of	Alaska-caught	snow	crab	($103	
million	worth	in	2012)	and	to	a	lesser	extent	king	crab	to	China.	The	degree	
to	which	China	is	re-exporting	Alaska	crab	or	mixing	it	with	other	crab	is	also	
unclear.		
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Trade Complexity
SECTION HIGHLIGHTS
Triangular trade, re-processing, and re-export are legal trade 
practices, yet can lead to supply chain murkiness and provide 
opportunity for mixing illegal and legal products or other 
seafood laundering mechanisms.
Triangular Trade  
– Crab Stop-off in Asian Ports  
before Coming to the U.S.
The	international	trade	of	crab,	like	the	international	trade	of	
any	primary	commodity,	is	part	of	a	larger	system	of	global	trade	
and	shipping	and	is	thus	subject	to	the	same	trade	norms	and	
practices	as	other	traded	goods.	Triangular	trade	or	a	trade	route	
where	goods	are	shipped	through	one	or	more	countries	en	route	
to	their	final	destination	is	a	common	global	trade	practice.	In	
the	case	of	triangularly	traded	crab,	the	seafood	product	might	
remain	on	board	a	vessel	which	simply	stops	off	in	a	free	trade	
and	economic	zone	in	a	foreign	port,	or	it	may	be	offloaded,	con-
solidated,	and	then	re-loaded	onto	a	different	vessel	that	brings	
the	product	to	its	final	destination.	Triangular	trade	appears	to	be	
a	legal	trade	dynamic	that	creates	murkiness	in	a	product’s	sup-
ply	chain.	This	opaqueness	can	be	compounded	by	mismatched	
customs	data,	as	each	trade	partner	could	account	for	trade	
through	this	third	country	differently.
For	instance,	take	the	specific	example	mentioned	in	the	pre-
vious	section	on	Russia-South	Korea,	and	Russia-U.S.	trade	
data	discrepancies.	Russia’s	crab	trade	with	the	United	States	
via	South	Korea	illustrates	triangular	trade	well.	Indeed,	Russia	
registered	no	exports	of	crab	to	the	United	States	in	2012.	At	
the	same	time,	the	United	States	registered	21%	of	its	total	crab	
imports	as	Russian	origin	in	the	same	year.	At	least	part	of	this	
trade	discrepancy	is	likely	due	to	triangular	trade.	
According	to	Russian	Customs,	in	2012,	frozen	and	live	crab	
exports	were	destined	for	South	Korea	(84.5%),	Japan	(7.5%),	
and	China	(0.4%).25		Russia’s	TINRO	Center	(2014,	98	-	100)	
explains	Russia’s	imprecise	customs	data	accounting	as	well	as	
why	bilateral	trade	discrepancies	exist	and	why	the	official	doc-
umented	trade	partner	as	registered	by	Russian	Customs	might	
also	be	incorrect:	
The	Country	of	Export	for	[Russian]	Federal	Customs	
Statistics	counts	the	country	that	is	indicated	on	the	
‘Customs	Cargo	Declaration.’		In	reality,	products	having	
passed	through	Customs	in	Russia	may	be	sent	not	to	the	
country	that	was	indicated	by	the	Customs	Cargo	dec-
laration,	but	to	a	different	country.	For	example,	in	the	
Customs	Cargo	Declaration	it	indicates	that	the	destina-
tion	country	for	exports	is	South	Korea.	But	the	products	
may	be	sent	directly	to	Japan	(or	to	a	different	country).		
Moreover,	products	may	be	delivered	to	South	Korea	in	
compliance	with	the	Customs	Cargo	Declaration.	But	the	
cargo	then	transits	to,	for	instance,	the	U.S.A.	or	Japan.	In	
this	case,	products	wouldn’t	be	counted	in	the	statistical	
imports	of	South	Korea,	but	instead	would	be	counted	as	
imports	from	Russia	in	that	country,	where	the	proce-
dures	of	import	are	performed	(in	this	case,	either	U.S.A.	
or	Japan).	
25	According	to	Russian	Customs,	in	2012,	Russia’s	only	other	remaining	live	
and	frozen	crab	exports	went	exclusively	to	the	Netherlands	(7.2%)	and	United	
Kingdom	(0.5%)	and	negligible	quantities	of	live	crab	went	to	Italy	and	France.
Crab harvesting vessel on the 
rough and icy Bering Sea.
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This	is	particularly	problematic	for	supply	chain	traceability	
because	vessels	whose	final	destination	is	the	U.S.	often	list	
Asian	ports,	such	as	Wakkanai,	Japan	and	Busan,	South	Korea,	
as	intermediate	ports	in	their	U.S.	customs	declarations.26  
Many	of	these	ports	are	notorious	for	their	complicity	and	
contribution	to	the	laundering,	storage	and	shipment	of	illegal	
crab	into	the	global	supply	chain.	Each	node	of	the	supply	chain	
could	be	an	opportunity	to	launder	crab,	with	the	primary	ques-
tionable	nodes	for	U.S.	imports	of	Russian	crab	being	South	
Korea	and	Japan.	Once	Russian	illegal	crab	is	laundered	into	
the	legal	supply	chain	of	crab,	it	would	appear	in	official	trade	
statistics;	however,	imports	may	not	be	registered	to	the	cor-
rect	trade	partner.	Figure	10	indicates	the	registered	origin	of	
aggregated	live	and	frozen	crab	imports	by	China,	South	Korea,	
Japan	and	the	United	States	in	2012.
Triangular	trade	adds	complexity	to	trade	routes,	yet	it	can	be	
entirely	legal.	Product	traceability	systems	could	serve	to	make	
this	complexity	transparent	to	traders,	buyers,	governments	
and	consumers	(see	Recommendations).	
26	WWF	has	a	subset	of	fine-scale	United	States	Customs	crab	import	trade	data	
for	the	years	2007-2013.	These	Customs	records	include	U.S.	companies’	imports	
of	Russian	crab	and	indicate	that	South	Korean	and	Japanese	ports	are	commonly	
listed	as	‘Ports	of	Departure,’	even	though	the	commodity	itself	is	listed	under	the	
commodity	description	as	‘Russian	crab.’	
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Re-processing and Re-export
A	common	practice	in	the	global	trade	of	primary	commodities	
is	to	process	and	thus	substantially	alter	an	original	product	
(for	example,	process	frozen	crab	into	canned	crab)	and	then	
re-export	that	product	in	its	converted	form.	This	secondary	
processing,	where	the	product	is	altered	and	then	re-exported,	
can	also	contribute	to	the	murkiness	of	the	supply	chain.	It	
also	provides	the	opportunity	to	mix	legal	and	illegal	crab,	or	
re-label,	re-package	or	otherwise	launder	illegal	crab	to	make	it	
appear	legal.	For	U.S.	imports,	re-processing	and	re-export	also	
serve	to	obfuscate	the	country	of	catch	because	U.S.	Country	of	
Origin	Labeling	rules	do	not	require	this	information	for	pro-
cessed	seafood.
While	re-exports	are	common	practice	in	the	global	sys-
tem	of	international	trade,	it	is	unclear	to	what	extent	these	
multi-country	value	chains	facilitate	the	entry	of	illegal	product	
into	international	commerce.	Certainly	these	practices	and	
the	reporting	discrepancies	and	supply	chain	murkiness	that	
they	create	make	supply	chain	traceability	and	other	anti-IUU	
initiatives	difficult	to	implement	and	enforce.	What	is	known	is	
that	illegal	crab	enters	the	supply	chain	but	legal	and	common	
trade	practices	make	the	detection	of	illegally	harvested	prod-
ucts	extremely	difficult.	However,	comparisons	of	official	trade	
data	from	each	country	can	be	used	to	help	decipher	where	crab	
laundering	may	be	taking	place.
FIGURE 10
PACIFIC RIM CRAB IMPORTS BY CHINA, SOUTH KOREA, JAPAN AND THE U.S. IN 2012
Data Source: Global Trade Atlas (2014)
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Estimation of Crab IUU
SECTION HIGHLIGHTS
During the past decade, WWF estimates illegal crab harvest 
ranged from approximately 1.7 to 4 times the legal harvest 
limit. This is seen in the trade data, and WWF’s estimates 
are on par with other illegal crab harvest estimates. After 
analyzing trade data for king crab specifically, WWF estimates 
that U.S. and Japanese imports of Russian king crab were 
approximately double the legal Russian TAC in 2010-2012.
Method for Estimating IUU and 
Data Limitations
The	methodology	widely	used	to	determine	IUU	estimates	is	to	
identify	the	differences	in	receiving	countries’	official	customs	
import	volumes	and	compare	that	to	official	data	from	the	
country	of	export	(TAC,	harvest/catch/landing	data	or	export	
data)	(Willock	2004).	One	must	also	take	into	account	domestic	
consumption,	but	in	this	case,	it	has	been	documented	that	the	
domestic	consumption	of	crab	is	low	which	means	that	Russia	
exports	most	of	its	crab	harvest	(TINRO	2014).	This	enabled	
WWF	to	compare	crab	import	data	to	official	harvest	amounts	
and	Russian	export	figures.	
Estimates	of	IUU	activity	typically	involve	bilateral	coun-
try-to-country	trade	data.	For	reasons	demonstrated	above,	
however,	related	to	the	inaccuracies	and	complexities	of	trade	
routes	in	the	Asia	Pacific	Region,	country-to-country	compar-
isons	of	trade	data	are	not	reflective	of	the	true	multinational	
trade	routes	for	crab.		For	this	analysis,	aggregated	trade	
data	from	Russia’s	main	crab	trade	partners	were	used.27  
Therefore,	import	data	was	used	from	the	following	four	
countries:	Japan,	South	Korea,	China	and	the	United	States.	
Live	and	frozen	crab	imports	from	Russia	were	aggregated	and	
27 Even	though	Russia	does	register	some	frozen	crab	exports	to	the	United	
Kingdom	(0.5%	of	Russia’s	total	live	weight	equivalent	metric	ton	weight	for	
frozen	and	live	crab),	and	miniscule	live	crab	exports	to	France	and	Italy,	these	
markets	are	not	considered	Russia’s	primary	trade	partners.
then	compared	to	Russia’s	TAC	and	officially	reported	(legal)	
harvest/catch	data	for	all	crab	species.28 
The	difference	between	Russia’s	crab	catch	(harvest)	or	export	
quantities	and	the	collective	imports	of	receiving	countries	
cannot	be	entirely	labelled	as	illegal	product.	All	international	
trade	statistics	contain	discrepancies.	With	respect	to	bilateral	
trade,	one	country’s	reported	exports	are	rarely	identical	to	its	
trading	partner’s	reported	imports	of	that	product.	Some	factors	
that	lead	to	trade	discrepancies	are	normal	(legal)	and	have	
justifiable	explanations,	while	others	are	abnormal	and	can	be	
the	manifestation	of	illegal,	unreported	or	unregulated	harvest	
and	trade.	There	appears	to	be	little	research	into	the	underly-
ing	causes	of	international	trade	discrepancies	in	the	seafood	
sector,	and	there	is	an	absence	of	what	might	be	considered	a	
‘normal’	trade	discrepancy,	or	of	ways	to	account	for	factors	
other	than	illegality	that	contribute	to	trade	discrepancies.29  
Given	this	lack	of	understanding,	WWF’s	estimate	of	illegal	crab	
volumes	reflects	total	observed	trade	discrepancies	and	may	be	
somewhat	overestimated.	
28	In	order	to	sum	frozen	and	live	crab	imports,	a	conversion	ratio	was	used	
that	assumes	the	frozen	weight	is,	on	average	for	all	crab	species,	60%	of	the	live	
weight.	This	is	the	same	conversion	ratio	for	live	(round)	weight	equivalent	for	
crab	that	is	used	by	TINRO.
29	This	necessary,	but	missing,	depth	of	understanding	of	the	international	trade	
of	seafood	is	an	obvious	recommendation	for	further	research	and	an	oversight	of	
current	IUU	seafood	research	at-large.	In	this	regard,	there	is	much	to	be	gained	
by	looking	at	the	problems	and	research	related	to	the	international	trade	in	other	
primary	commodity	sectors.	For	example,	Eastin	and	Perez-Garcia	(2003)	sought	
to	better	understand	trade	discrepancies	in	forest	products	and	might	be	used	as	a	
foundation	in	parallel	research	for	interpreting	normal	and	abnormal	reasons	for	
discrepancies	in	seafood	trade	data.
Frozen, whole red king 
crab at market.
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There	are	various	sources	of	TAC30,	production	(legal	or	official	
harvest/catch)31	and	export	data32	for	Russian	crab	with	no	
single	source	being	comprehensive	enough	to	supply	all	three	
sets	of	data.	Ideally,	for	purposes	of	analysis,	the	TAC	levels,	
production	levels	and	levels	of	trade	would	be	reported	in	a	way	
that	could	allow	for	comparison.	The	following	variables	affect	
the	resolution	(specificity)	of	data:	
a)		 TAC	or	harvest	area	reported	by	incongruous	regions	
(for	instance,	United	National	Food	and	Agricultural	
Organization	[UN	FAO]	zones	vs.	Russia’s	harvest	zone	
jurisdictions).	
b)		 Species	specificity	between	datasets	(for	instance,	records	
are	kept	by	genus	and	species	for	TAC,	but	Russia’s	harvest	
data	are	aggregated	whereas	trade	data	use	Harmonized	
System	(HS)	codes	that	are	different	for	each	country).
c)		 Incomplete	documentation	of	trade	partner	chain	(i.e.	a	
country’s	Customs	department	registers	the	product	being	
exported	to	one	country,	while	the	Customs	department	
of	the	actual	importing	country	registers	the	product	as	
imports	from	a	different	country).
d)		 Poor	HS	Code	specificity	in	trade	data	(global	standards	
require	identical	nomenclature	through	the	first	six	digits	
of	an	HS	code.	Countries	are	required	to	assign	two	more	
digits	[not	required	to	be	globally	standardized],	for	a	total	
of	eight	digits	at	the	tariff-rate	line	level.	Countries	can	
elect	to	assign	two	more	digits	[for	a	total	of	ten	digits]	if	it	
is	warranted).	See	the	Appendix	for	a	detailed	evaluation	of	
crab-specific	HS	codes	used	by	Russia	and	its	primary	crab	
trade	partners.
For	this	analysis,	data	were	compiled	for	all	Russian	commer-
cial	crab	species	for	several	reasons.	First,	WWF	was	only	able	
to	obtain	Russian	catch	data	that	had	been	aggregated	to	all	
crab	(i.e.	not	species	specific).	Second,	with	regard	to	trade	
30	Russian	TAC	data	(including	adjustments)	was	compiled	from	TINRO	(2014)	
and	Russian	Federal	Fishery	Agency	–	TAC	(2014).
31	Russian	official	harvest/catch	data	were	compiled	from	Russian	Federal	
Fishery	Agency	–	Harvest	Data	(2014).
32	Trade	data	were	compiled	from	Global	Trade	Atlas	(2014).
data,	not	all	importing	countries	specify	more	than	the	six-digit	
HS	code.	Without	the	utilization	of	the	total	available	ten	digits	
of	an	HS	code,	species	specificity	cannot	be	discerned.	Third,	
there	is	a	discrepancy	in	the	common	and	scientific	names	of	
crab	species	used	by	each	country.	Finally,	TINRO	identifies	
that	illegal	fishing	is	present	in	all	of	Russia’s	commercially	
valuable	crab	fisheries,	including	bairdi,	opilio,	and	Japanese	
hair	crab	(TINRO	2014;	2013;	2011).
Estimation of Illegal  
Crab Amounts 
(All Crab Species)
This	WWF	report	provides	an	estimate	of	potential	Russian	
crab	IUU	based	on	analysis	of	trade	data	discrepancies	of	select	
reporting	countries’	imports	of	Russian	crab	compared	to	
Russia’s	total	allowable	catch	(TAC)—identified	by	WWF	(1),	
and	select	reporting	countries’	imports	of	Russian	crab	com-
pared	to	Russia’s	official	harvest	catch	of	crab—identified	by	
WWF	(2)	(Table	3).
Table	3	lists	the	number	of	times	crab	may	have	been	harvested	
beyond	the	TAC	or	legal	catch	amount.	In	2013,	reported	
Russian	crab	imports	by	South	Korea,	Japan,	China,	and	
the	United	States	exceeded	Russia’s	TAC	by	38	percent,	and	
exceeded	Russia’s	officially	reported	legal	crab	harvest	by	69	
percent.	
These	overages	(i.e.,	the	number	of	times	aggregated	import	
data	exceed	Russia’s	data)	can	then	be	compared	to	other	
sources’	estimates	of	trade	discrepancies	regarding	Russian	
crab	overharvest	and	potential	IUU.		The	utility	of	comparing	
aggregated	imports	to	both	of	Russia’s	domestic	crab	indus-
try	indicators	is	to	establish	a	plausible	range	of	illegal	crab	
volumes.	Figure	11	shows	the	above	WWF	estimates	for	crab	
overexploitation	are	within	the	range	of	other	sources’	estimates	
for	Russian	illegal	crab	catch.
TABLE 3
RATIO OF AGGREGATE IMPORTS BY JAPAN, UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND SOUTH KOREA TO 
RUSSIA’S TAC (1) & HARVEST (2)
Data Sources: TINRO (2014; 2013; 2011), Russian Federal Fishery Agency –TAC (2014), Russian Federal Fishery Agency –Harvest Data (2014), Global Trade Atlas (2014)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Imports / TAC - WWF (1) 1.86 1.99 1.97 2.11 2.40 2.63 2.45 2.38 1.86 1.96 1.64 1.66 1.93 1.38
Imports /  Harvest - WWF (2) 2.07 2.46 2.63 3.21 4.01 4.26 4.35 3.83 3.10 3.27 2.14 1.97 2.15 1.69
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FIGURE 11
VARIOUS ESTIMATES OF DISCREPANCIES OF IMPORTS OF RUSSIAN CRAB VS. RUSSIAN TAC/
HARVEST, 2000-2013
Estimation of Illegal King Crab 
(Four Species) 
In	order	to	establish	an	estimate	for	Russian	king	crab	over-
harvest,	only	a	subset	of	the	trade	data	could	be	used	without	
aggregating	HS	codes	from	various	countries.	Only	Japan	and	
the	United	States	have	relatively	well-defined	HS	codes	beyond	
the	six-digit	level.33 
However,	comparing	Japan	and	U.S.	import	statistics	for	‘king	
crab’	is	still	problematic;	while	two	out	of	the	three	species	(red	
king	crab	and	blue	king	crab)	are	both	contained	within	each	
country’s	HS	code,	each	country’s	classification	of	this	particu-
lar	HS	code	also	contains	one	additional	species	of	crab	that	is	
not	contained	in	the	other’s	classification.34 
33	While	South	Korea	does	have	a	‘king	crab’	eight-digit	HS	code	classification	
for	its	frozen	crab	(03061420),	it	does	not	have	one	for	live	crab,	and	it	is	evident	
looking	at	trade	data	that	there	are	king	crab	that	likely	end	up	in	the	‘other	
crab’	HS	code	classification,	thus	making	comparative	analysis	with	South	Korea	
difficult.
  
34	Specifically,	at	the	eight-digit	level	Japan’s	HS	Code	classification	03061401	
(frozen)	and	03062411	(live)	is	designated	as	‘king	crab’	(Paralithodes	spp.)	and	
thus	contains	the	three	species	of	crab	that	are	within	the	Paralithodes	genus.	
Meanwhile,	the	United	States,	at	the	ten-digit	level	of	HS	Code	classification,	
reports	frozen	king	crab	(0306144010)	and	does	not	specify	a	genus.	In	the	
United	States,	three	species	are	most	often	classified	under	‘king	crab’:	two	in	the	
Paralithodes	genus	(red	and	blue	king),	and	one	in	the	Lithodes	genus	(golden	
king),	so	we	assume	that	these	three	species	are	recorded	in	the	U.S.’s	ten-digit	HS	
code	0306144010.
Data Sources: TINRO (2014), McDowell Group (2012), Inter-Cooperative Exchange (2011)
Comparing	Japanese	and	United	States’	imports	of	these	
subsets	of	‘king	crab’	to	the	aggregated	Russian	TAC	level	for	
the	identical	subsets	of	species	allows	for	consistent	analy-
sis.35	Table	4	highlights	the	number	of	times	each	country	has	
imported	the	‘king	crab’	subset	in	excess	of	Russian	legal	TAC	
quantities.	It	is	important	to	remember	that	each	analysis	is	
separate	from	the	other	and	considers	Russia’s	total	TAC	for	
the	species	indicated.	The	analysis	assumes	that	Russia	is	
only	exporting	crab	to	one	country,	either	Japan	or	the	United	
States,	but	not	both	together.	The	numbers	in	Table	4	cannot	
necessarily	be	added	together,	but	when	considered	together	in	
context,	these	numbers	indicate	that	imports	of	“king	crab”	by	
Japan	and	the	U.S.	far	exceed	the	Russian	TAC.
The	excess	level	of	imports	presumes	that	Japan	is	the	only	
importer	of	those	select	species,	which	in	practice	is	not	the	
case	given	that	the	United	States	also	imports	two	out	of	the	
three	species	in	high	quantities.	For	example,	in	2012,	Japan	
imported	twice	the	legal	TAC	level	of	red,	blue	and	spiny	brown	
crab	from	Russia,	and	in	the	same	year,	the	United	States	
imported	88%	of	all	of	Russia’s	TAC	for	red,	blue	and	golden	
king	crab.	Although	these	two	numbers	(2.07	and	0.88)	cannot	
be	added	together,	these	numbers	show	that	king	crab	is	likely	
exploited	between	two	and	three	times	the	TAC	in	2012.
35	TAC	is	used	for	this	analysis	because	no	species-level	harvest/catch	data	could	
be	obtained.
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TABLE 4
RUSSIA-JAPAN (TOP) AND RUSSIA-U.S. (BOTTOM) 
BILATERAL COMPARISON OF OFFICIAL IMPORT DATA 
COMPARED TO RUSSIAN TAC
Sources: Russian Federal Fishery Agency – TAC (2014), Russian Federal Fishery Agency – Harvest 
Data (2014), TINRO (2014), Global Trade Atlas (2014) 
2010 2011 2012
Live weight equivalent metric tons of Japan's Imports 
of Paralithodes spp. (3 species: red, blue and spiny 
brown) / Russian TAC for those 3 species
1.08 1.3 2.07
Live weight equivalent metric tons of USA's Imports 
of Paralithodes spp. (3 species: red, blue and golden) 
/ Russian TAC for those 3 species
1.15 1.02 0.88
Photo courtesy of Josh Thomas
Crab harvesting vessel 
on the Bering Sea.
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Photo courtesy of Josh Thomas
Conservation Impacts of 
Crab Overexploitation
SECTION HIGHLIGHTS
Crab in the Russian Far East is 
at risk of collapse due to the 
overharvest caused by illegal 
fishing. Recently, the red king 
crab fishery in West Kamchatka 
was closed for five years to allow 
for rebuilding. Continued illegal 
overharvest could result in the 
severe decline of crab stocks in 
the Russian Far East.
Crab Management Overview
Russian	Far	East	crab	stocks	are	assessed	through	scien-
tific	trawl	surveys	(typically	performed	annually),	and	stock	
assessment	models	from	regional	research	institutes	(including	
TINRO)	combined	with	fishery	dependent	(catch)	data	the	
TACs	are	set	for	each	sub-zone.		Historically,	Russia’s	TAC	set-
ting	process	left	incentive	for	fisheries	scientists	to	take	bribes	
and	thus	the	TAC	levels	were	not	necessarily	based	on	science	
(Thorsteinson	2011;	Allison	2002).
Currently,	the	TAC	setting	process	results	from	a	scientific	
estimation	of	a	maximum	sustained	yield	based	on	crab	stocks’	
dimensional	structures,	calculated	total	biomass	and	numbers	
of	females,	males	and	recruits	(juveniles).		The	fishing	mortal-
ity	rate	(the	rate	at	which	crab	are	removed	from	the	stock	by	
harvesting)	is	set	at	or	below	20%	in	stable	populations,	and	is	
reduced	to	10%	in	rebuilding	populations.	In	calculating	harvest	
limits,	illegal	harvests	are	taken	into	account,	yet	no	additional	
information	is	available	regarding	how	estimations	of	illegal	
harvest	are	made	or	are	taken	into	account	(Korostelev	2014).	
Since	the	break-up	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	1991,	the	Russian	
government	has	repeatedly	modified	the	allocation	processes.	
In	the	early	2000s,	Russia	began	granting	quotas	(shares	of	the	
total	TAC,	by	species)	to	individual	companies	for	a	period	of	
five	years	based	on	each	company’s	prior	three	years	of	catch	
volumes	(Thorsteinson	2011).	Companies	harvest	this	quota	
using	vessels	that	are	either	company-owned	or	leased.	The	
duration	of	quota	shares	was	altered	in	2008	to	ten	years.	The	
most	recent	ten-year	quota	allocation,	2009-2018,	specifies	
which	companies	have	fishing	quotas	by	species	and	fishing	
sub-zone	(Russian	Federal	Fishery	Agency	2008).
Overharvest
The	most	direct	negative	biological	impact	of	the	illegal	crab	
fishery	in	Russia	is	overfishing.	Based	on	trade	data,	WWF	
estimates	that	the	illegal	crab	harvest	amount	has	been	at	least	
double,	in	some	years	quadruple,	the	legal	harvest	amount.	
Depending	on	the	year,	red	king	crab	is	harvested	at	a	rate	
between	one	to	almost	three	times	over	the	TAC;	snow	crab	
(opilio	and	bairdi)	is	similarly	overharvested	(TINRO	2014).	
Long-term	overharvest	can	be	seen	in	the	trade	data	for	the	past	
decade	(see	Figure	1).
Excessive	removal	of	male	crab	can	skew	the	sex	ratio,	mak-
ing	it	impossible	for	the	few	remaining	male	crab	to	fertilize	
the	much	higher	number	of	female	crab.	Sex	ratio	disparity	is	
thought	to	have	contributed	to	the	collapse	of	the	Kodiak	red	
king	crab	fishery	(Bechtol	and	Kruse	2009;	Juneau	Empire	
2007).	
Susceptible Crab Aggregations 
Characteristics	of	adult	red	king	crab	(age	8	to	30	years)	can	
be	exploited	(or	overexploited)	by	harvesters.	Juvenile	and	
adult	crabs	seasonally	migrate	and	congregate	for	protection	
from	predation	(juveniles),	to	inhabit	preferred	habitat,	and	
to	mate	(adults)	(Ivanov	2002).		All	crab	harvesters	target	
known	crab	aggregations	to	ensure	a	high	catch-per-unit	effort	
(CPUE).	Because	of	this	aggregating	tendency,	the	CPUE	for	
crab	could	remain	stable	while	the	abundance	and	range	of	
a	crab	stock	shrinks	(Erisman	et	al.	2011).	Hyperstability,	as	
this	is	called,	is	one	reason	why	catch	data	alone	is	not	a	good	
indicator	of	crab	abundance	or	the	health	of	a	stock	(Rose	and	
Kulka	1999).
Bering Sea crab boat. 
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All	legal	crab	harvesters	target	known	adult	male	aggregation	
areas.	Illegal	harvesters	target	these	areas	also	whether	or	not	
they	are	closed	to	the	legal	fishery.	The	West	Kamchatka	sub-
zone,	the	area	that	once	had	the	highest	abundance	of	red	king	
crab	in	the	Russian	Far	East,	was	closed	for	five	years	(2008	
through	2012)	due	to	conservation	concerns.	Illegal	harvesters	
may	have	crabbed	in	this	area	during	the	closed	period,	which	
may	have	slowed	the	rebuilding	of	that	stock.	
Reduced Crab Fecundity 
In	the	legal	Russian	crab	fishery,	the	harvest	season	is	
September	1	to	December	31.	Female	and	juvenile	crab	cannot	
be	retained.	To	facilitate	maximum	reproduction,	females	are	
not	harvested	(one	male	can	mate	with	multiple	females	so	it	is	
believed	that	males	can	be	harvested	without	lowering	a	popu-
lation’s	reproductive	potential).	Females	and	juveniles	are	also	
typically	smaller	and	therefore	of	lower	market	value.	
The	illegal	crab	fishery	is	not	confined	by	these	Russian	harvest	
rules.		Japanese	port-landing	records	include	Russian-origin	
female	and	juvenile	crab,	as	well	as	year-round	live	crab	landings,	
illustrating	that	Russian	fisheries	management	policies	estab-
lished	to	protect	crab	reproduction	may	be	ignored	by	illegal	
harvesters	to	the	detriment	of	crab	stocks	(Karaivanov	2012).
Regime Shifts and Food Web 
Instability
King	crab,	being	very	large,	are	major	predators,	scavenging	
along	the	ocean	floor	for	bivalves	and	other	epibenthic	biota.	
This	scavenging	behavior	stirs	up	benthic	sediments.	Crab	
and	crab	larvae	are	also	preyed	upon;	Pacific	cod	is	the	main	
predator	of	red	and	blue	king	crab	(North	Pacific	Fishery	
Management	Council	2011).	Overexploitation	of	king	crab	in	
the	Russian	Far	East	could	have	food	web	impacts	such	as	an	
increase	in	epibenthic	fauna	abundance	or	a	decrease	in	cod	
abundance,	although	these	indirect	impacts	are	not	known.	
Persistent	overexploitation	of	a	top	benthic	predator	has	caused	
regime	shifts	in	other	marine	ecosystems,	such	as	excessive	
removal	of	cod	in	the	North	Atlantic	(Frank	et	al.	2005).	Similarly,	
the	red	king	crab	fishery	around	Kodiak	Island	in	Alaska	experi-
enced	overexploitation	and	a	climate	regime	shift	simultaneously,	
which	caused	the	crab	population	to	crash	and	fail	to	rebuild	
(Bechtol	and	Kruse	2009).	Red	king	crab	was	so	heavily	exploited	
in	the	1970s	around	Kodiak	Island	that	the	sex	ratios	were	likely	
skewed,	which	decreased	reproduction	and	recruitment.	At	the	
same	time,	the	North	Pacific	experienced	a	larger	climatic	shift,	
which	brought	warmer	waters	to	the	area,	creating	favorable	con-
ditions	for	Pacific	cod,	which	prey	on	juvenile	crab.	Overharvest,	
combined	with	an	external	factor	(a	period	of	warmer	water),	
resulted	in	a	regime	shift	where	crab	was	no	longer	abundant	
enough	to	sustain	a	commercial	crab	fishery.	Time	and	area	clo-
sures	were	not	effective	in	reversing	the	decline;	the	fishery	 
was	closed	in	1983.	The	Kodiak	Island	red	king	crab	fishery	did	 
not	rebuild,	and	there	is	no	commercial	fishery	today.		
Detrimental Fishing Behavior 
Driven by Market Pressure
External	market	forces	drive	the	behavior	of	illegal	crab	har-
vesters	(see	Box	10	on	Japanese	horsehair	crab).	These	external	
market	forces	include	demand	for	large	crab	(live)	and	crab	
legs	(frozen),	demand	for	clean	shelled	(no/few	barnacles	or	
scratches,	marks	or	missing	claws)	crab	and	crab	legs	(both	live	
and	frozen),	and	demand	for	crab	around	the	Christmas	and	
New	Year	holidays	(live	and	frozen).		Illegal	crab	harvesters	
probably	prefer	to	harvest	large	crab	(usually	male)	and	clean-
shell	crab	because	they	fetch	the	highest	price.		
High-grading	for	these	more	desirable	individuals	likely	
occurs	in	the	illegal	crab	fishery	and	may	also	occur	in	the	
legal	crab	fishery	(on-board	observer	coverage	in	the	legal	
Russian	crab	fishery	is	3	to	5%).	High-grading	is	problematic	
because	large	female	crab	are	the	most	fecund	(have	the	most	
eggs)	and	will	only	mate	with	large	males.	If	body	size	has	a	
heritable	component,	selective	removal	of	the	largest	individ-
uals	(male	or	female)	will	result	in	evolution	of	the	population	
toward	smaller	mean	body	size	and	the	loss	of	genetic	diver-
sity	(Allendorf	et	al.	2004).
In	summary,	crab	in	Russia’s	Far	East	is	almost	certainly	being	
overfished	and	has	been	overfished	for	ten	or	more	years.	Due	
to	illegal	fishing,	the	Russian	Far	East	crab	fishery	is	at	risk	of	
not	leaving	enough	males	for	mating,	depleting	lucrative	crab	
aggregations	and	local	populations	and	failing	to	protect	closed	
areas	from	harvest	pressure.	Overharvest	resulted	in	the	closure	
of	the	red	king	crab	fishery	in	the	West	Kamchatka	harvest	
sub-zone	for	five	years.	Continued	overharvest	could	result	in	
the	collapse	of	crab	stocks	in	part	or	all	of	the	Russian	Far	East,	
could	alter	the	ecosystem	and	food	web	systems	within	that	
same	range	and	crab	could	become	scarce	for	human	consump-
tion	and	predators	alike.
BOX 10
JAPANESE HORSEHAIR CRAB: AN EXTREME 
EXAMPLE 
While historically red king crab has been the most valuable 
crab species in Russian waters, there is high demand for many 
of Russia’s other crab species, and thus all crab species face 
pressures related to IUU fishing. Foreign imports of most 
of Russian crab species greatly exceed Russia’s own official 
TAC and production. For instance, Russia’s TAC for Japanese 
horsehair crab (Erimacrus isenbeckii) has recently been low at 
90-471 mt (198 thousand to 1 million lbs.), but the Japanese 
horsehair crab is in high demand in Japan and thus Japanese 
imports exceeded Russia’s official TAC by 24.8 times in 2010.  
Importantly, TINRO acknowledges that high rates of IUU fishing 
persists for all Russian crab species and is prompted by the 
high demand, and hence high market value, for Russian crab, 
particularly in Japan and the United States. Source: TINRO (2014)
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The	illegal	harvest	of	Russian	crab	is	of	major	international	
concern.	This	WWF	report	shows	that	Russian	crab	continues	
to	be	harvested	at	unsustainable	levels	due	to	the	continued	
prevalence	of	illegal	crab	fishing	in	Russian	waters.	In	addition	
to	documenting	the	scale	of	Russian	illegal	crab	catch	and	the	
attempts	of	bilateral	agreements	to	deter	illicit	activities,	Boxes	
2-10	highlight	specific	examples	of	illegal	crab	fishing	which,	
taken	together,	show	that	illegal	harvesting	of	crab	contin-
ues	to	be	a	problem	both	in	the	Russian	Far	East	and	in	the	
Barents	Sea,	and	is	perpetrated	both	by	Russian	nationals	and	
foreigners.
The	continued	prevalence	of	illegal	crab	harvesting	means	that	
there	is	high	uncertainty	about	the	overall	ecological	health	of	
Russia’s	native	crab	populations	in	the	Far	East.	As	this	WWF	
report	shows,	without	accurate	assessments	and	control	of	IUU	
activity,	Russian	crab	populations	could	be	susceptible	to	cat-
astrophic	decline.		This	precarious	situation	needs	immediate	
attention	and	multilateral	action.	
WWF	encourages	those	involved	in	the	management,	harvest,	
policy,	trade	and	consumption	of	crab	to	take	action	and	insist	
that	crab	be	traceable	to	verifiably	legal	sources.	In	order	to	
achieve	this	goal,	WWF	recommends	the	following:
FOR LEGAL RUSSIAN HARVESTERS 
The	Far	East	Crab	Catchers	Association	publically	speaks	out	
against	the	illegal	crab	fishery	on	behalf	of	its	members.36		The	
Association	and	its	constituent	companies	should	continue	
to	advocate	for	more	stringent	protocols	and	regulations	in	
order	to	eradicate	IUU	fishing	and	related	corruption	from	
the	industry.	The	Association	is	also	contemplating	Marine	
Stewardship	Council	(MSC)	certification,	which	would	provide	
a	thorough	third-party	assessment	of	stock	health.	Additionally,	
MSC	Chain	of	Custody	certification	would	provide	assurances	to	
buyers	and	consumers	of	product	source	and	legality.	
• Harvesters should join the Far East Crab Catchers 
Association to bolster support and lobby for reform.
• The Far East Crab Catchers Association should 
attempt to become MSC certified.
FOR U.S. AND JAPANESE IMPORTERS/BROKERS/
BUYERS OF RUSSIAN CRAB 
FOR U.S. BUYERS -	Under	the	Lacey	Act,	the	responsibility	
of	legality	lies	with	the	importer,	and	thus	importers	should	use	
due	diligence	to	determine	the	provenance	and	supply	chain	of	
crab.	Buyers	should	not	only	insist	that	they	need	to	see	veri-
fied	documentation	on	the	location	of	catch	(not	just	place	of	
36	The	Far	East	Crab	Catchers	Association	is	currently	led	by	Aleksandr	
Pavlovich	Duplyakov.
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Photo courtesy of Josh Thomas
A full crab pot being pulled up 
from the bottom of the sea to a 
crab boat for harvest.
ILLEGAL RUSSIAN CRAB: AN INVESTIGATION OF TRADE FLOW 29ILLEGAL RUSSIAN CRAB: AN INVESTIGATION OF TRADE FLOW
landing/export)	from	their	suppliers	but	also	conduct	site	visits	
with	their	suppliers.	
FOR JAPANESE BUYERS -	Under	the	bilateral	agreement	
and	the	foreign	exchange	laws,	importers	are	responsible	for	
eliminating	illegal	Russian	crab	from	the	Japanese	seafood	
market	(Japan	Fisheries	Agency	2014).	Companies	should	
ensure	supply	chain	legality	and	should	support	their	suppliers	
to	move	towards	sustainable	production.	
FOR BOTH U.S. AND JAPANESE BUYERS
• Require the correct documentation, including 
catch certification.
• Support the establishment of transparent trace-
ability systems for all seafood, including crab.
• Support MSC certification of crab harvesters.
FOR THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND RUSSIAN 
FEDERAL FISHERY AGENCY
The	Russian	national	plan	for	addressing	IUU	should	be	
implemented.	Catch/Harvest	documentation	should	contain	
information	on	the	specific	species	and	specific	zone	(or	sub-
zone)	of	the	origin	of	catch,	in	addition	to	listing	the	place	of	
landing/export.	It	is	unknown	whether	daily	catch	reports	
include	this	level	of	detail	because	they	are	not	publicly	avail-
able.	This	information	and	the	daily	catch	reports	should	be	
made	publicly	available	so	that	anyone	can	verify	the	daily	ves-
sel	reports	and	importers	of	Russian	crab	can	verify	the	legality	
of	their	crab	imports.
• Improve quota and landings documentation and 
make the information available to the public for 
verification. 
• Require all legal crab vessels to regularly broad-
cast a signal that can be monitored by satellite, and 
monitor signals as an enforcement mechanism. 
• Seek improved partnerships between agencies to 
implement Russia’s national plan of action to com-
bat IUU fishing.
• Introduce a new law that makes it an offense for 
Russian nationals (citizens and companies) to be 
involved in IUU activities, regardless of the flag 
state of the fishing vessel or support vessel involved. 
FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
The	Presidential	Task	Force	on	Combating	Illegal,	Unreported	
and	Unregulated	Fishing	and	Seafood	Fraud	should	recom-
mend	the	creation	of,	under	current	law,	a	globally	harmonized	
and	comprehensive	system	to	ensure	that	all	seafood	sold	in	
the	United	States	is	fully	traceable	to	verifiably	legal	sources.		
Such	a	system	should	be	capable	of	addressing	Russian	illegal	
crab	as	well	as	other	IUU	fishing	activities.	A	final	system	of	
verifiable	traceability	and	proof	of	legality	should	be	built	to	
help	streamline	existing	import	and	food	safety	requirements	
and	processes,	should	mirror	the	data	transmission	require-
ments	that	already	apply	to	U.S.	domestic	fishermen,	should	
be	flexible	enough	to	withstand	the	passage	of	time	and	should	
encourage	industry	innovation.	A	system	for	verifiable	trace-
ability	and	proof	of	legality	should	incorporate	the	following	
concepts:	catch	documentation	and	traceability	requirements	
for	all	seafood	sold	in	the	U.S.,	adequate	digital	tracking	and/
or	recordkeeping,	refusal	of	entry	for	all	seafood	products	that	
fail	to	provide	evidence	of	legal	origin,	and	a	verification	system	
structured	around	risk-based	and	random	audits.	The	President	
should	adopt	such	recommendations	following	the	Task	Force	
submission	and	should	direct	relevant	agencies	to	promulgate	
regulations,	through	a	public	process,	to	meet	basic	system	
objectives.		
• Presidential Task Force on IUU Fishing and 
Seafood Fraud recommends, and President Obama 
adopts, a comprehensive system based on concepts 
of proof of legality, traceability, and verification 
to ensure that all seafood sold in the United States 
is fully traceable to verifiably legal sources.  Task 
Force agencies then promulgate regulations to 
meet system objectives.
FOR THE JAPANESE, SOUTH KOREAN, AND  
U.S. GOVERNMENTS
Bilateral	agreements	may	be	a	productive	starting	place,	but	
based	on	the	connectivity	of	trade	between	Russia,	Japan,	
South	Korea	and	the	United	States,	it	is	imperative	that	a	multi-
lateral	working	group	and	initiative	be	adopted	among	the	four	
countries.	This	multilateral	initiative	could	be	used	to	create	a	
unified	system	throughout	the	Pacific	Rim	for	all	Russian	crab	
importing	countries,	consistent	and	harmonized	with	existing,	
relevant	systems	in	those	individual	countries.
• Establish an IUU initiative between Russia, South 
Korea, Japan and United States specifically to 
address IUU crab as an immediate short-term 
measure and adopt harmonized regulations as a 
longer-term goal. 
• Require seafood imports, including crab, to show 
verifiable evidence of legality, supported by digital 
tracking and/or recordkeeping. 
FOR ALL GOVERNMENTS 
Government	agencies	should	appeal	to	the	World	Customs	
Organization	(WCO)	to	require	more	increased	harmonization	
for	products,	like	crab,	that	are	nearly	impossible	to	track	to	the	
species-level	with	only	the	required	eight-digit	code	(of	which	
only	six-digits	are	harmonized).	Two	implications	arise	with	
regard	to	HS	codes	for	crab:	
30 ILLEGAL RUSSIAN CRAB: AN INVESTIGATION OF TRADE FLOW
Crab	is	particularly	problematic	due	to	the	fact	that	there	are	
multiple	species	of	crab	that	are	often	combined	under	com-
mon	names	(i.e.	‘king	crab’	often	includes	three	species	in	the	
U.S.,	see	Appendix).	Given	that	the	first	division	within	the	HS	
code	system	is	to	have	a	frozen/live	split,	this	takes	up	all	of	the	
six-digits	required	to	be	harmonized	(030614	for	frozen	crab	
and	030624	for	live	crab).		If	two	more	digits	were	required	to	
be	harmonized	(eight	total),	then	the	seventh	and	eighth	digits	
could	be	used	to	enumerate	all	crab	species	around	the	world	
individually	by	genus	and	species	(if	there	are	less	than	99	spe-
cies	around	the	world).	
Having	species-level	harmonization	codes	requires	inspectors,	
customs	officers,	law	enforcement	and	others	involved	in	the	
movement	of	the	specific	goods	to	be	trained	to	identify	with	high	
accuracy	the	given	product.	Relevant	governments	should	under-
stand	these	limitations	and	advocate	for	increased	funding	for	
the	training	of	its	public	servants	to	deal	with	all	illegal	seafood.	
• Improve Harmonization System (HS) Codes for all 
North Pacific crab as well as for other fish and sea-
food species that indicate large trade discrepancies 
between trade partners and are also suspected IUU 
fisheries.
• Share trade data (imports, exports, forecasts,  
and TACs).
• Share enforcement intelligence in real time, 
including vessel movements.
• Harmonize more than the trade codes between 
countries: harmonize appropriate laws, vessel 
markings, recording of vessel movements, etc. 
FOR CONSUMERS OF KING AND SNOW CRAB:
Consumers	of	crab	should	inquire	about	the	origin	of	crab	and,	
if	it	is	Russian	crab,	ask	the	supplier	about	the	measures	taken	
to	ensure	its	legality.
• Buy and eat only legal crab, and ask for verification 
of legality.
• Lobby your government to require that country of 
catch information on all seafood (processed and 
fresh), including crab, be available to consumers.
© WWF-US / Heather Brandon
Red king crab.
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